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Abstract 
Individuals with social anxiety engage in maladaptive interpersonal transactional cycles. They 
expect others to respond negatively to them, and engage in socially undesirable behaviours that 
lead to their predictions being realized (Alden & Taylor, 2004). In exploring mechanisms 
underlying these expectancies, we previously found that participants high in social anxiety 
overvalue confidence as an indicator of interpersonal desirability. We hypothesized that this 
perception may exaggerate the perceived inferiority of the self as compared to confident others, 
thereby fuelling socially avoidant behaviour. The present study extended those findings by 
manipulating and studying social comparisons as a possible mechanism fuelling negative 
interpersonal expectancies. Participants with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and healthy controls 
(HCs) were randomized to watch a confederate (who was believed to be a fellow participant) 
deliver a speech in either a visibly anxious or confident manner. Participants then rated their 
perceptions of the presenter’s desirability (i.e., the extent to which he possesses various desirable 
attributes) and their desire for future interaction with him. Subsequently, they were asked to 
compare themselves to the presenter before they delivered their own speeches. Participant 
speeches were subsequently rated by coders. We hypothesized that observable signs of anxiety 
and confidence displayed by potential social partners represent important indicators of social 
desirability and would moderate desire for future interaction amongst participants with SAD. 
Results suggest that all participants irrespective of social anxiety status judged the visibly anxious 
presenter as being less desirable and less interested in interacting overall. The more favourably 
participants rated the presenter’s desirability relative to their own, the more they wished to interact 
with him in the future. Coders also rated participants with SAD as less desirable, and as less 
interpersonally warm than HCs. Thus, visibly anxious individuals may be judged by others as 
being less desirable in general (i.e., having less positive qualities or social currency), as less warm, 
and as less interested in interacting socially. On the other hand, confident individuals were seen 
consistently as more desirable, warm, pleasant, and appealing to interact with. As a result of this 
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favourable social standing and increased interpersonal options resulting from it, these individuals 
may therefore be viewed as being unattainable as social partners for individuals who are 
themselves visibly anxious. One implication of these findings is that socially anxious individuals 
may need help conveying interpersonal warmth and interest to potential social partners in order to 
allow such partners to see past the social anxiety and discover the positive qualities of the anxious 
individual. Theoretical and treatment implications of these findings to cognitive and interpersonal 
models of SAD are considered. 
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Introduction 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is one of the most prevalent psychological disorders, with 
a lifetime prevalence rate of approximately 12% (Kessler et al., 2005). It is characterized by 
persistent fear of one or more social situations that are avoided entirely or endured with high 
levels of distress (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Individuals with SAD have been 
shown to experience significant difficulties related to their anxiety symptoms across several life 
domains, including school and work, social and romantic relationships, and overall quality of life 
(Stein & Kean, 2000). Given both the high prevalence and detrimental, impairing nature of SAD, 
significant research efforts have focused on understanding the cognitive and interpersonal factors 
contributing to the maintenance of SAD symptoms.  
It is noteworthy that empirical studies examining cognitive and interpersonal processes in 
social anxiety have recruited both clinical samples of individuals with symptoms meeting 
diagnostic criteria for SAD, as well as analogue (typically, student) samples of individuals whose 
scores on self-reported measures of social anxiety (e.g., the Social Phobia Inventory, SPIN; 
Connor et al, 2000), resemble the scores obtained by clinical participants with SAD. While 
results of studies on clinical participants are more likely to be generalizable to individuals with 
SAD, these can be difficult to recruit. Thus, both recruitment approaches are common, and the 
data from both types of studies will be reviewed together. When discussing specific studies and 
their findings, the type of participants (clinical or analogue sample) will be specified. 
Cognitive Models of Social Anxiety: Flawed Self and Inflated Social Threat 
Clark and Wells’ (1995) cognitive model was one of the earliest, seminal attempts to 
provide a complete cognitive account of the processes underlying and maintaining SAD. 
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The model centered on the premise that individuals with SAD are motivated to make positive 
impressions on others, but due to a series of unhelpful beliefs about the self and others, feel 
unable to secure such impressions. As a result, a heightened sense of threat in social situations is 
activated. The threat is maintained by an increased perception of the probability and cost 
associated with being evaluated negatively by others (loss of status or worth, criticism, ridicule, 
or rejection), resulting in a constellation of cognitive, somatic, affective, and behavioural 
responses that maintain and exacerbate the perception of social threat, and make the individual 
appear less warm and friendly, thereby eliciting negative responses from others. 
Clark and Wells (1995) emphasized the role of maladaptive assumptions and self-
schemata in SAD, which serve to maintain the perception of social danger and strengthen the 
underlying beliefs that negative social outcomes are both probable and costly. They identified a 
number of classes of common beliefs reported by individuals with SAD, including excessively 
high self-standards for social performance (e.g., I must appear intelligent or witty), unconditional 
negative beliefs about the self (e.g., I am strange, odd, or peculiar), and conditional beliefs about 
social evaluation (e.g., if I show feelings or make mistakes, others will reject me).  
  The authors also emphasized the detrimental downstream effects of the heightened sense 
of social threat, including increased physiological arousal, attentional shift toward internal threat 
and environmental threat, and in-situation safety behaviours. All of these, according to the 
authors, negatively impact the ability of individuals with SAD to be successful in social tasks 
and drive them to avoid the negative interpersonal consequences that they fear. Safety 
behaviours are a broad class of behaviours that are used by anxious individuals to cope with the 
perception of imminent danger and minimize the perceived likelihood of feared outcomes 
(Salkovskis, 1991). In social anxiety, safety behaviours (e.g., attempting to conceal one’s 
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anxiety, limiting self-disclosure) have been implicated in maintaining symptoms (see 
Moscovitch et al., 2013). Clark and Wells (1995) identified two important reasons why safety 
behaviours might be problematic. First, they prevent the disconfirmation of the unrealistic beliefs 
about the feared behaviours and their consequences (e.g., someone who wears excessive makeup 
to hide her blushing due to the belief that blushing will lead to ridicule would not be able to 
disconfirm this belief without eliminating the makeup and determining whether ridicule ensues). 
As well, in some cases, safety behaviours actually lead to an exaggeration of the feared 
behaviour (e.g., grasping an object to hide shaking of one’s hands may actually exaggerate the 
shaking). More recent research has also found that safety behaviours may have the additional 
impact of making socially anxious individuals feel more anxious and inauthentic during 
interactions, and as a result, come across as  more distant, aloof, and cold (e.g., Plasencia, Alden, 
& Taylor, 2011).  
 In summary, Clark and Wells’ model emphasized the role of maladaptive beliefs about 
the self and others, and one’s perceived inability to achieve a positive impression on others, as 
the central maintenance processes in SAD, which have important downstream effects on 
affective responses and social and interpersonal behaviour. Following Clark and Wells (1995), 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997) further refined the cognitive understanding of SAD with their 
cognitive model. They emphasized the notion that socially anxious individuals, in their attempt 
to secure a positive appraisal from others, tend to form and maintain moment-by-moment mental 
representations of themselves as seen from the vantage point of their imagined evaluators in 
which they compare their in-vivo social performance with perceived audience standards. In 
theory, this heightened sense of self-awareness and appraisal of own performance may seem like 
a helpful way of monitoring one’s social behaviour. Unfortunately, the perceptions of 
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performance of individuals with SAD tend to be imbued with the individual’s own negative, 
critical self-views and beliefs, and tend to reinforce the notion that one’s performance is not 
measuring up to audience standards. In this way, these increase the perceived probability and 
catastrophic consequences of not measuring up to social standards, heighten the sense of social 
danger, and lead to behavioural, cognitive, and physical expressions of anxiety. One of the key 
additions of Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) model to the model proposed by Clark and Wells 
(1995) is the emphasis on the imagined audience and unattainable standards for social 
performance as two important factors that maintain high levels of social anxiety. The authors 
argued that in social situations, socially anxious individuals perceive themselves to be under 
constant scrutiny by a harsh and critical audience that possesses social standards that are utterly 
unattainable for the self. Rapee and Heimberg (1997) further argued that this audience, rather 
than being a true reflection of any real interaction partners or external standard, actually 
represents the projection of the socially anxious individual’s own sense of inadequacy and 
inferiority. Nonetheless, this imagined sense of being scrutinized and judged negatively by an 
evaluative audience with unattainable standards is thought to propagate the experience of social 
anxiety. 
These seminal models of SAD by Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg 
(1997) have inspired a large number of studies and have generally garnered strong empirical 
support (for a review, see Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). They continue to serve as an important 
foundation for the current understanding of SAD. A more recent model by Hofmann (2007) 
further refined the cognitive conceptualization of SAD. One of the unique contributions of this 
model that is relevant to the current study is the notion that individuals with SAD perceive 
themselves to have little control over their own negative emotional response, and believe that 
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their negative emotions are highly visible to others. The belief that one’s negative, anxious 
feelings are highly visible to partners, as well as potential beliefs about the implications of 
displaying visible anxiety, may add to the perceived threat and sense of imminent social failure 
Finally, in a recent model, Moscovitch (2009) reframed the notion of social threat in SAD 
from feared social situations to feared self-attributes that might become exposed and lead to 
ridicule, criticism, or social rejection. Moscovitch identified three domains of feared self-relevant 
attributes that individuals with SAD fear would come under scrutiny and lead to social mishaps. 
These are (1) perceived flaws in social skills and competence, (2) displaying visible anxiety, and 
(3) perceived flaws in physical appearance. The notion that participants with SAD hold negative 
beliefs about themselves was a premise shared among the cognitive models, but this model was 
unique in that it categorized the negative beliefs into the most common themes and proposed 
these self-attributes and associated beliefs as important, individualized ways to customize 
therapy according to each client’s self-perceived flaws. Consistent with Hofmann (2007), 
Moscovitch argued that a substantial proportion of individuals with SAD are highly preoccupied 
with their perceived signs of social anxiety, and hold catastrophic beliefs about the likelihood 
and cost of their anxiety becoming visible to others. 
 To summarize, Clark and Wells (1995) introduced the notion that maladaptive beliefs 
about the self and others fuel the perception of threat in social anxiety. Rapee and Heimberg 
(1997) expanded on the earlier model by emphasizing socially anxious individuals’ perceptions 
of an imagined critical audience and high, rigid perceived standards for social performance, 
which are thought to be projections of their own sense of inadequacy and inferiority, combined 
with a heightened sense of scrutiny, judgment, and unattainably high social standards. Hofmann 
(2007) contributed the notion of social transparency, suggesting that when individuals with SAD 
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experience social anxiety, they believe this anxiety is out of their control, is readily observable to 
social partners, and is highly undesirable to others and likely to lead to feared negative outcomes 
(e.g., rejection). Finally, Moscovitch (2009) identified three classes of negative self-relevant 
flaws that individuals with SAD worry about revealing to others, including concerns about being 
socially incompetent, physically unattractive, and visibly anxious.  
Informed by these seminal models of SAD, the current study was aimed at investigating 
the ways self-relevant beliefs and information about social partners interact to shape predictions 
and interpersonal behaviour. What about the self is seen as likely to elicit negative reactions in 
social partners, and is this equally true in all contexts?  Displaying visible social anxiety has been 
a recurring theme across the cognitive models outlined earlier, and has been shown to be 
perceived by a large subset of individuals with SAD as being highly socially costly (e.g. 
Moscovitch & Huyder, 2011). Conversely, concealing anxiety is presumably seen by individuals 
with SAD as both important and productive, which motivates a class of safety-behaviours with 
this as the central aim. We sought to understand the impact of these beliefs about displaying 
visible anxiety and social confidence on interpersonal predictions and behaviour.  
Specifically, we examined whether individuals with SAD uniquely appraise visible 
anxiety as being catastrophic, and confidence as being highly desirable. Perhaps confident social 
partners, by virtue of possessing the confidence that anxious individuals desire but lack, elicit a 
heightened sense of inferiority in individuals with SAD and heighten the sense of social threat 
and unattainable standards. Conversely, anxious partners may be appraised as more alike or on 
par with the self, less desirable, less threatening, and as having more attainable social standards. 
It seems worthwhile to compare these perceptions of standards to the actual standards held by 
nonanxious individuals (i.e., the typical “audience” likely to be encountered by those with SAD) 
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and to examine how visible anxiety and confidence impacts actual liking or social rejection. It is 
noteworthy that because of the emphasis on interpersonal evaluations in this study, the focus of 
the present study was deliberately chosen to be signs of anxiety and social confidence that are 
visible to others, rather than the internal, subjective experience of anxiety and confidence. The 
specific methodology used in this study is described below.  
Negative Self-Relevant Beliefs  
Negative self-perception is identified as an important causal and maintaining factor for 
SAD across the cognitive models outlined (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007; Leary & 
Kowalski, 1995; Moscovitch, 2009; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The notion that individuals with 
SAD see themselves as fundamentally flawed or deficient has received considerable research 
attention. Studies on this topic have consistently found that socially anxious individuals rate 
themselves less positively and more negatively as compared to individuals without social 
anxiety. For example, individuals with high levels of social anxiety or a clinical diagnosis of 
SAD have been shown to be negatively biased when rating their interpersonal performance on 
social tasks such as first encounters with unfamiliar others, overestimating the negative aspects 
of their performance as compared to the ratings of observers (e.g., Alden & Wallace, 1995; Stopa 
& Clark, 1993). Similar tendencies to rate the self negatively have emerged when individuals 
high in social anxiety have been asked to rate their more stable personality characteristics, such 
as physical attractiveness, quality of life and relationships, intelligence, and achievements (e.g., 
Moscovitch, Orr, Rowa, Gehring Reimer, & Antony, 2009; Wilson & Rapee, 2006).  
Interestingly, negative self-relevant perceptions have been shown to persist regardless of 
whether a given interaction was objectively successful or unsuccessful (e.g., Alden & Wallace, 
1995). However, when social interactions are experimentally designed to go particularly poorly, 
INTERPERSONAL EXPECTANCIES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY  
 
8 
 
individuals with high levels of social anxiety have been shown to display additional biases, 
including biases in their interpretation of both the reasons for, and consequences of, these 
negative interactions. For example, Wilson and Rapee (2005) demonstrated that individuals high 
in social anxiety and those with a clinical diagnosis of SAD were more likely to attribute 
negative social events to negative, stable personality attributes in themselves, and were also more 
likely to believe that these events would have costly consequences and would result in negative 
evaluation by others. Surprisingly, even when interactions were ostensibly successful, 
individuals with high social anxiety were shown to attach more negative, anxious implications to 
these events, such as tending to doubt the veracity of the seemingly positive behaviours their 
partners displayed towards them (e.g., believing partners were only pretending to be interested in 
them to be polite), believing that others would expect more of them in future interactions as a 
result of the current performance, and believing that their social successes would be short-lived 
and inevitably followed by more negative events (e.g., Alden, Taylor, Mellings, & Laposa, 2008; 
Wallace & Alden, 1991; Wallace & Alden, 1997). In summary, negative biases in socially 
anxious individuals seem to extend beyond seeing the self in an exceedingly negative way and to 
encompass a series of interactive biases that negatively colour both their predictions and 
interpretations related to social encounters.  
Interpersonal Perspectives on Social Anxiety: Inflated Standards 
In addition to holding negative, exaggerated beliefs about the self, individuals with high 
levels of social anxiety have also been shown to have a number of other important biases relating 
to their beliefs and predictions about other people. For example, individuals with high levels of 
social anxiety have been shown to believe that others hold unreachable or overly rigid social 
expectations, standards that the self is seen as being unable to fulfill (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
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Hofmann, 2007; Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Interpersonal writers have written extensively on the 
central tension in social anxiety between the desire to make positive social impressions and be 
evaluated positively by others, and the lack of efficacy or perceived ability of the self to fulfill 
this goal.  This tension is thought to lead socially anxious individuals to enter social encounters 
expecting negative social outcomes and behave in self-protective ways aimed at reducing 
negative interpersonal outcomes. Alden & Taylor (2004), for example, have identified 
maladaptive interpersonal transactional cycles in SAD, wherein individuals with SAD enter 
social situations predicting and expecting negative outcomes (e.g., “I will come across as socially 
incompetent and be rejected”). According to these authors, such negative beliefs paradoxically 
make socially anxious individuals behave in ways that increase the likelihood of negative 
interpersonal evaluations (e.g., “trying too hard” to portray a desirable but inauthentic self to 
social partners in an effort to gain approval, or concealing aspects of the self by behaving distant 
or limiting disclosure). A substantial body of work supporting these ideas has emerged. For 
example, two earlier studies by Alden and Wallace (Alden & Wallace, 1991; Wallace & Alden, 
1991) showed that individuals high in social anxiety experienced higher levels of discrepancy 
between the perceived social standards they were aiming to meet, on the one hand, and their 
perceived ability or efficacy in meeting those standards, on the other. This discrepancy, in turn, 
led to a higher perception of social threat and higher levels of subsequent withdrawal from the 
interaction. Other studies have also provided support for the idea that social threat motivates 
unhelpful behaviours (e.g., safety behaviours), and that these behaviours contaminate social 
interactions by maintaining or increasing anxiety over the long term, eroding the felt sense of 
authenticity and reducing self-concept clarity (e.g., Orr & Moscovitch, 2015). Safety behaviours 
have also been shown to elicit negative evaluation by social partners, who rate individuals using 
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them as being less warm and less similar to the self; moreover, these partners also report more 
negative emotions during interactions with socially anxious individuals who use safety 
behaviours, ultimately reducing overall connectedness and resulting in less liking and higher 
rates of rejection of such individuals (e.g., McManus, Sacadura, & Clark, 2008; Placensia et al., 
2011; Rowa et al., 2015; Voncken, Alden, Bögels, & Roelofs, 2008).  
Given the central role in social anxiety of the perceived discrepancy between the 
demanding standards of the social world and one’s ability to meet these standards, experimental 
studies have been designed to further clarify this standards-ability discrepancy. To this end, a 
small number of studies have suggested that individuals with higher levels of social anxiety 
perceive others to hold unreachable (high or overly rigid) standards for interpersonal 
performance both for themselves and for others (e.g., Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007; 
Moscovitch, Rodebaugh, & Hesch, 2012). For example, in one study in which participants 
imagined themselves and others committing common social blunders, researchers found that 
individuals with high social anxiety rated the interpersonal costs of fairly common blunders as 
considerably higher than those without social anxiety, regardless of whether it was the self or 
another person committing the blunder. These findings suggest that imagined costs were 
primarily driven by the perceived consequences of violating social standards or norms, 
seemingly irrespective of whether the person violating such standards is believed to have high or 
low levels of “social currency.” Conversely, several studies have shown that individuals with 
high social anxiety believe that they will fall short of standards not because standards are viewed 
as unreasonably high but because certain qualities inherent to themselves make failing to reach 
others’ standards particularly likely, including lacking the skills or personality attributes that are 
desired by their partners. As a result of these stable, global shortcomings, individuals with high 
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levels of social anxiety perceive themselves as particularly likely to fall short and to elicit 
negative responses from partners (e.g., Alden, Bieling, & Wallace, 1994; Moscovitch, Waechter, 
Bielak, Rowa, & McCabe, 2015; see also Moscovitch, 2009; Wallace & Alden, 1991).  
Social Skills Deficits 
One important question that follows from this research is whether this perception of 
inferiority that is held by individuals with high social anxiety reflects some realistic shortcoming 
in social skills or personality, or whether it is more indicative of a negative bias in self-
perception that is not truly reflective of reality. Some studies have suggested that individuals 
with high social anxiety do tend to come across as less socially skilled as compared to those 
without social anxiety (e.g., Baker & Edelmann, 2002; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Thompson & 
Rapee, 2002; Voncken, Alden, & Bögels, 2006; Voncken et al., 2008, Voncken, Dijk, de Jong, & 
Roelofs, 2010). However, cognitive behavioural theorists have suggested that individuals with 
high social anxiety generally possess the abilities needed to perform successfully in social 
interactions, but that their use of these skills is hindered or inhibited by their preoccupation with 
perceived expectations (or standards) of others, shortcomings of the self, and the perceived costs 
of falling short of perceived standards (see Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Supporting these claims, a prominent study by Rapee and Lim (1992) examined the differences 
between self and audience ratings of a short speech task by individuals with SAD and controls. 
Rapee and Lim (1992) found that, while there were no differences in the observer rating of the 
performance on the task by individuals with SAD and controls, individuals with SAD rated 
themselves as having performed significantly worse than controls. More recent studies on the 
topic (e.g., Inderbitzen-Nolan, Anderson, & Johnson, 2007; Norton & Hope, 2001) have 
suggested that individuals with SAD do not, in fact, perform as well as controls on social tasks, 
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but that they also display additional negative biases in their self-evaluations, underestimating 
their own performance on these tasks to a degree that exceeds actual performance deficits. These 
studies suggest that both objective social deficits and negative biases in self-evaluation impact 
the cognitions, performance, and social outcomes of individuals with SA, and raise additional 
questions regarding the ways in which these two processes interact. 
Safety Behaviours and their Consequences 
Related to the mixed literature on social skills deficits in social anxiety, there is now a 
considerable, fairly consistent body of empirical support for the notion that beliefs about the 
likelihood of interpersonal failure or rejection motivate the use of subtle avoidance or self-
concealment behaviours in social situations (e.g., failing to show adequate warmth, limiting self-
disclosure), which in turn make socially anxious individuals seem less warm, interested, and 
approachable and therefore less desirable to others as social and relational partners (Rowa et al., 
2015; see review by Alden & Taylor, 2004). To further understand these behaviours, a recent 
study by Plasencia, Alden, and Taylor (2011) examined the various types of safety behaviours 
that individuals with SAD display while engaging in a social interaction. These researchers 
demonstrated that socially anxious participants’ use of safety behaviours that functioned as 
avoidance strategies (e.g., avoiding eye contact, deliberately appearing distant) were associated 
with higher levels of rejection by social partners (i.e., lower ratings of desire for future 
interaction) than safety behaviours aimed at impression management (i.e., acting overly 
agreeable). These findings provide support for the notion that self-protective strategies 
presumably aimed at distancing and protecting the self from negative partner responses may 
actually facilitate the occurrence of these feared partner responses, and add to a growing 
literature on the negative affective, cognitive, and interpersonal consequences of self-
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concealment in social anxiety (see also Moscovitch et al., 2013; Orr & Moscovitch, 2015). It is 
noteworthy that in the study by Plasencia et al. (2011), safety behaviours that were aimed at 
impression management did not result in negative interpersonal consequences. Clearly, 
appearing distant or attempting to conceal aspects of the self is significantly more interpersonally 
costly than attempting (albeit not in a completely genuine way) to be interested, engaged, or 
agreeable. 
A study by Voncken et al. (2008) provides further insight into why self-protective safety 
behaviours may have detrimental consequences on partner perceptions and responses. Voncken 
and her colleagues asked confederates to rate the social performance of individuals with and 
without SAD, the emotions that interacting with the participant evoked in them, the perceived 
similarity between themselves and the participant, and the level of desire for future interaction 
with the participant. Findings indicated that, when collapsing across the entire sample of 
individuals with SAD and HCs, higher levels of self-reported social anxiety symptoms were 
associated with poorer performance in the interaction task, elicited more negative emotions in the 
confederate, led to the participant being perceived as more dissimilar to the self, and ultimately 
led to lower ratings of desire amongst confederates for future interaction with the participant 
(i.e., social rejection). It seems possible that when individuals with SAD engage in self-
protective strategies, especially those oriented at concealing the self or certain perceived 
shortcomings, social partners may be able to detect that their social partner is not being totally 
present in the interaction. This appears to make the interaction less rewarding and positive for 
partners, leading them ultimately not to desire continued interaction with the socially anxious 
individual. 
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In sum, while the extant research suggests that there may indeed be underlying social 
skills deficits in some socially anxious individuals contributing to these individuals doing more 
poorly on both performance (e.g.., Rowa et al., 2015) and interaction social tasks in the lab, and 
having less satisfaction with their own friendships (Rodebaugh, 2009; Rodebaugh et al., 2012), a 
more consistent feature among individuals with SAD is a general class of beliefs about 
unattainable social standards and one’s own inability to measure up, which result in the use of 
social avoidance and self-protective behaviours. Ironically, these behaviours are, at least in part, 
responsible for increasing the likelihood of these same feared outcomes (e.g., interpersonal 
rejection) -- a pattern of results that has been demonstrated across a large number of studies 
(Alden & Bieling, 1998; Heerey & Kring, 2007; Meleshko & Alden, 1993; Moscovitch et al., 
2013; Papsdorf & Alden, 1998; Plasencia et al., 2011; Wenzel, Graff-Dolezal, Macho, & 
Brendle, 2005). It is crucial to understand whether there are partner characteristics that make 
individuals with SAD particularly likely to employ these self-jeopardizing self-concealment 
strategies, and to help clients identify partner characteristics and social behaviours that are likely 
to facilitate a positive interpersonal experience. 
Psychoevolutionary Models of Social Anxiety: Social Rank and Affiliation 
There have been significant efforts over the past three decades to understand the 
psychoevolutionary origin and purpose of social anxiety. The bulk of this research has focused 
on the two central systems governing social behaviour in both humans and animals which are 
thought to maintain social order: the rank system and the affiliation system. The rank, 
dominance, or power system governs cues related to relative rank, power, and control within 
interpersonal interactions. Conversely, the affiliation system is sensitive to displays of intimacy, 
reciprocity, and belonging. These two orthogonal attributes of warmth (or affiliation) and 
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dominance comprise the interpersonal circumplex model of personality (Leary, 1957), and can 
be used to describe individual interpersonal behaviours and global interpersonal tendencies (e.g., 
Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 1990; Trower & Gilbert, 1989). Both the dominance and affiliation 
system are thought to be implicated in the experience and maintenance of social anxiety. 
 An early psychoevolutionary model of social anxiety was put forth by Trower and 
Gilbert (e.g., Trower & Gilbert, 1989). In this model, the experience of socially anxious 
individuals was described as consistent with the experience of low-ranked members of an animal 
hierarchy (e.g., primates). They describe social threat as a perception or awareness of oneself as 
being low in the social hierarchy, and thus being constantly ready to be on the receiving end of 
hostility or dominant gestures from more dominant members of the group. Individuals with 
social anxiety, much like low-ranked members of an animal hierarchy, engage in social 
interactions under a heightened state of threat, and must be ready to engage in submissive 
behaviours (e.g., acting overly agreeable, avoiding eye contact) or escape in order to avoid harm 
at the hand of others, who are often perceived as dominant (and potentially hostile). Indeed, the 
notion that individuals with social anxiety are particularly sensitive to cues related to social rank 
and dominance, and less attuned to cues related to safety, warmth and affiliation, has gained 
considerable support (e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; Hope, Sigler, Penn, & 
Meier, 1998; Weeks, Heimberg, & Heuer, 2011). Aderka, Weisman, Shahar, and Gilboa-
Schechtman (2009) recently found evidence that perceptions of oneself as having a low social 
rank lead to increased levels of social anxiety as well as subsequent depression. Weeks, 
Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton, & Jakatdar, (2009) tested the notion that an overarching class of 
cognitions related to submissive social rank was related to and predictive of both social anxiety 
and depressive symptoms. Indeed, they found support for a mediation model in which 
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submissive cognitions mediated the relationship between social comparisons and submissive 
behaviours. It appears, then, that social comparisons, particularly upward comparisons, might be 
a crucially important source of social information that triggers a broad schema of beliefs and 
appraisals of the self as inferior and submissive, which then feed increased submissive 
behaviours. In sum, there is an emerging body of research support for the notion that socially 
anxious individuals are particularly attuned to and concerned with cues related to social rank or 
dominance, perceive themselves as holding an inferior and tenuous social position, and respond 
consistently in a submissive manner to social partners (e.g., Cain, Pincus, Holforth, 2010; Hope 
et al., 1998; Weeks et al., 2009). 
There is also a growing body of research emerging in support of the notion that in being 
preoccupied with social rank and power and threats to their already tenuous social standing, 
individuals with higher levels of social anxiety are both less sensitive to detecting cues of 
warmth or affiliation in others and less likely to convey warmth in their own actions (e.g., Cain 
et al., 2010; Rodebaugh et al., 2015; see review by Gilboa-Schechtman & Shahar-Lavie, 2013). 
Although there is support for the notion that individuals with high levels of social anxiety come 
across as less warm or more cold than those without social anxiety, it has also been widely 
established in the interpersonal literature that behaviours conveying warmth are conducive to 
relationship initiation and maintenance. In fact, the interpersonal quality of extraversion (often 
conceptualized as a combination of warmth and dominance) primarily relates to the formation of 
positive early impressions (Borkenau, Brecke, Mötig, & Paelecke, 2009), while the quality of 
agreeableness (warm submissiveness) is thought to contribute to longer-term liking, the 
maintenance of relationships and relationship satisfaction (Wortman & Wood, 2011). Thus, the 
interpersonal style of individuals with social anxiety, which is typically cold and submissive (and 
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less frequently, cold and hostile, see Cain et al., 2010), can be perceived as being lower on 
extraversion and somewhat lower on agreeableness (for a review, see Levinson, Kaplan, & 
Rodebaugh, 2012), and may place individuals with social anxiety at a considerable disadvantage 
both in forming positive initial impressions and in their ability to maintain and enhance existing 
relationships.  
Social Comparisons 
 Given the careful attention paid by individuals with high social anxiety toward social 
rank information and threats to their social status, potentially at the expense of being aware of or 
displaying important interpersonal cues related to affiliation (see Gilboa-Schechtman & Shahar-
Lavie, 2013), it is worthwhile to consider what information individuals high in social anxiety use 
to determine their social rank or status. What specific cues do these individuals consider in order 
to conclude that they are inferior and must therefore act submissively to avoid negative social 
consequences, and is this conclusion equally likely regardless of social context? The relevant 
information is likely to be elicited through observing the self and others, and sizing oneself up 
relative to other members of the social group through the process of social comparisons. Social 
comparisons are evaluations of the self relative to one or more other people based on a given 
domain (Festinger, 1954). Psychologists have long argued that people gain important 
information about themselves and the world through observing others (e.g., Festinger, 1954; 
Morse & Gergen, 1970). Leary, Tambor, Terdal and Downs (1995) described self-esteem, or an 
individual’s appraisal of the worth of the self, as being intimately related to the perceived 
evaluation of the worth of the self by others. Some have argued (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000) 
that self-esteem is seen as an interpersonal gauge or “sociometer” that is sensitive to the degree 
to which an individual is valued by others. According to this view, under conditions of relational 
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devaluation, a sense of threat or distress (expressed as increased feelings of social anxiety) serves 
as an alarm signal to trigger a change in behaviour that is designed to restore or protect the 
individual’s relational value. Social anxiety and depression are both viewed as possible 
downstream products of such unfavourable activation of the sociometer (Baumeister & Tice, 
1990; Leary & Kowalksi, 1995).  
Social comparisons appear to be one important way in which information about the self, 
others, and others in relation to the self are collected and integrated. Social comparison processes 
have received considerable theoretical and empirical attention, and are thought to be universal 
and fundamental processes within human social behaviour (e.g., Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995). 
Researchers have studied social comparisons that occur in individuals’ daily lives using a 
combination of daily diaries (e.g., Wheeler & Miyake, 1992), self-report measures (e.g., Iowa-
Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), and, somewhat more 
infrequently, experimental tasks in which salient social comparison information (e.g., 
participants’ and others’ scores on a test) is offered to participants and their preferences in 
selecting and using this information are studied (e.g., Gibbons et al., 2002).  
In the context of social comparisons in nonclinical samples, one robust finding is that 
downward comparisons – i.e., ones in which the self is seen as superior to a target - have positive 
impact on anxiety and mood. It is not surprising, then, that individuals who are feeling threatened 
or uncertain in some way have been shown to be more motivated to seek and engage in 
downward comparisons. Importantly, this comparison behaviour has been shown to be helpful in 
alleviating negative affect (e.g., Gibbons, 1986; for a review of this literature, see Buuk & 
Gibbons, 2007). Conversely, it has also been shown that the tendency to engage in upward 
comparisons, or comparisons in which the self is seen as inferior to others, is associated with 
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dysphoric mood, low self-esteem, and depression, with its negative effects on self-concept 
demonstrated to be long-lasting (Ahrens & Alloy, 1997; Butzer & Kuiper, 2006; Giordano, 
Wood, & Michela, 2000; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Wheeler & 
Miyake, 1992; Wood, 1989; see Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991, for a detailed review).  
A consistent difference between individuals with low self-esteem and dysphoria and 
those with higher self-esteem has been found in their tendency to engage in upward versus 
downward social comparisons. Many studies have found that individuals with low self-esteem, 
rather than seeking out and engaging in downward comparisons in order to experience the 
uplifting impacts on mood of such comparisons, are more likely to engage in upward 
comparisons that maintain their negative self-esteem and depressive cognitions (e.g., Swallow & 
Kuiper, 1988; see review by Wood & Lockwood, 1999). In a review, Wood and Lockwood 
offered a number of potential motivations underlying social comparisons: (a) self-evaluation 
(attempting to resolve the uncertainty about the position of the self relative to others), (b) self-
validation (seeking individuals who are similar to the self to compare to), (c) self-protection 
(attempting to avoid awareness of one’s flaws), and (d) self-deprecation (seeking evidence 
consistent with negative self-relevant schemata), and (e) self-enhancement (seeking evidence for 
a favourable evaluation of the self). Based on the pattern of social comparisons observed in high 
and low self-esteem individuals, the authors reasoned that while healthy individuals are more 
likely to use social comparisons for self-enhancement motives, individuals with low self-esteem 
and depression tend to use comparisons for self-evaluation, self-validation, and self-deprecation. 
These authors highlighted the notion that individuals generally have a wide range of available 
targets with whom to compare at any given time (e.g., close others, colleagues, people on the 
street, the media). It is likely, then, that individuals are systematic in (though perhaps not 
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completely aware or in control of) the choices they make in terms of whom to compare 
themselves to, and that these choices have  considerable impact on the outcome of comparisons 
as well as downstream impact on mood and self-concept. 
 While social comparisons have received considerable attention in the context of self-
esteem and depression, the literature on social comparisons in social anxiety has remained 
surprisingly modest, particularly in light of the theoretical and empirical overlap between the 
concepts of social anxiety, self-esteem, and depression, as well as the psychoevolutionary 
motivations for competition and social comparison in social anxiety. One exception was a 
seminal diary study of social comparisons in SAD that was conducted by Antony, Rowa, Liss, 
Swallow, and Swinson (2005). These researchers used a diary paradigm based on Wheeler and 
Miyake’s (1992) Rochester Social Comparison Diary, a measure that allows participants to track 
social comparisons occurring in their daily lives. Participants in this study were instructed to 
write about situations in their daily lives in which they engaged in social comparisons, and to 
indicate the dimensions across which they were comparing themselves and what their perceived 
standing was on these dimensions compared to the individuals to whom they were making these 
comparisons. Consistent with predictions, Antony et al. (2005) found that individuals with SAD 
engaged in more frequent social comparisons, especially upward comparisons with others across 
a variety of domains (most commonly including intelligence, appearance, and quality of 
relationships), and that these comparisons resulted in state increases of anxiety and dysphoric 
mood. Thus, Antony et al.’s (2005) study supported the notion that individuals with SAD are 
highly motivated to compare themselves to others, and that their comparisons often result in the 
self being seen as inferior and in significant negative affective consequences.  
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In another relevant study, Aderka, Weisman, Shahar, and Gilboa-Schechtman (2009) 
asked a nonselected sample of women about their perceptions of social rank, attachment, social 
anxiety and depression. The group found support for a hypothesized mediational model wherein 
perceptions of the self as having low social rank contributed to elevated social anxiety, which, in 
turn, was associated with increased symptoms of depression. In a related study by the same 
group, Weisman, Aderka, Marom, Hermesh, and Gilboa-Schechtman (2011) examined self-
reported measures of social rank, types and quality of relationships, as well as mood and anxiety 
symptoms, in four groups of participants: Individuals with SAD and comorbid depression, 
individuals with SAD without comorbid depression, individuals with other anxiety disorders and 
depression, and healthy controls. Weisman and colleagues used self-report measures to  
demonstrate that individuals with SAD tend not only to perceive themselves as being inferior to 
others overall, but also as having inferior interpersonal relationships (i.e., having lower intimacy 
and closeness) in comparison to nonanxious controls. Furthermore, given the diversity of their 
sample, these researchers were able to demonstrate that the tendency among participants to 
perceive the self and their relationships as being inferior to those of others were distinctly 
associated with social anxiety, over and above the impact of symptoms of depression.  
Experimental Manipulation of Social Comparisons 
While these studies have contributed greatly to the present understanding of social 
comparisons in social anxiety, there are many questions that remain unanswered. In particular, 
do upward comparisons elicit different appraisals, emotional reactions, and behaviour from 
socially anxious individuals in social interactions than same-level or downward comparisons? 
Antony et al. (2005) and Weisman et al. (2011) have advanced the current understanding of 
social comparisons in social anxiety through studying naturalistic social comparisons. A recent 
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study by Mitchell and Schmidt (2014) experimentally manipulated and studied social 
comparisons in an analogue sample of students high vs. low in social anxiety by assigning 
participants to compare themselves to an experimentally manipulated vignette describing either a 
high or typically achieving fellow student. The authors found that individuals with higher levels 
of social anxiety who compared themselves to a high performing student (as compared to an 
average student) engaged in more negative self-appraisals of their own personality and signs of 
anxiety. On the other hand, the comparison manipulation did not seem to impact self appraisals 
of individuals low in anxiety. This study was the first that experimentally manipulated social 
comparisons to examine how individuals with high and low levels of social anxiety may differ in 
the ways they are impacted by such comparisons. One important limitation of this study is the 
use of a student sample, which may limit the generalizability of the findings to clinical 
populations.  
Present Study 
The aim of the current study was to advance emerging understanding of social 
comparisons in social anxiety and their downstream impact on predictions and behaviour. It was 
predicted  that the extent to which socially anxious individuals view themselves as being inferior 
or unable to “measure up” to their interaction partners directly impacts their interpersonal 
predictions of how their partner might react to them, with upward comparisons resulting in 
negative expectancies and predictions (see Leary, Kowalski, & Campbell, 1988; Strauman & 
Higgins, 1987; Wallace & Alden, 1991). While a variety of self flaws or perceived shortcomings 
likely contribute to negative appraisals and upward comparisons amongst individuals with SAD 
that they are unlikely to make the desired impression on social partners (e.g., see Moscovitch, 
2009), there is some evidence to suggest that information related to the level of anxiety or 
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confidence displayed by the self and others may be one particularly important moderating factor 
in guiding interpersonal predictions about interactions with specific partners. This view is 
supported by the writings of Mussweiler and Strack (2001) who argued that social comparisons 
are likely to occur when particular types of self-knowledge becomes salient. In social situations, 
individuals with social anxiety are highly internally focused on their own anxious cognitions and 
physical sensations, and may therefore seek to contrast this experience with those around them. 
They are also likely to make attributions about what their anxiety means about them, and what 
anxiety (or its apparent lack as in visible confidence) means about others. Consistent with this, 
socially anxious individuals have been shown in several studies to treat visible anxiety (or 
confidence) of new social partners as highly informative in predicting other attributes about an 
individual. For instance, in one study (Purdon, Antony, Monteiro, & Swinson, 2001), 
undergraduate participants with high or low levels of social anxiety were asked to reflect on how 
visible anxiety symptoms displayed by another person would affect their impressions of that 
person. In this study, individuals with high social anxiety attributed harsher judgments to 
individuals with observable symptoms of anxiety in social situations, such as perceiving them as 
having less strength of character and attractiveness as compared to the appraisals provided by 
participants with low levels of social anxiety. Similarly, Roth, Antony, and Swinson (2001) 
asked individuals with SAD and healthy controls to indicate how they tended to interpret anxiety 
symptoms (e.g., sweating, trembling, blushing) displayed by others, and how such symptoms 
were interpreted by others when they themselves displayed them. Results demonstrated that 
individuals with SAD tended to believe that others appraise the display of social anxiety 
symptoms as being more abnormal or indicative of severe anxiety or a psychiatric condition, 
rather than perceiving these to be normative experiences (Roth, Antony, & Swinson, 2001).  
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Additional support for the potentially key role of appraisals and comparisons related to 
what it means to display social anxiety or confidence comes from the psychoevolutionary 
account of social anxiety. As described above, this account emphasizes that the socially anxious 
individual, like any lower-ranking member within the animal hierarchy, perceives him or herself 
as inferior and submissive. Consequently, this individual is likely to experience anxiety due to 
being in a state of perpetual readiness to respond to threat, and is constantly preoccupied with 
scanning the environment for threat cues. From this perspective, it seems likely that socially 
anxious individuals must use certain schema to guide their decisions about whether another 
member of the pack is likely to be dominant, hostile, and potentially threatening to them. The 
psychoevolutionary models of social anxiety emphasize that the “reptilian brain” (e.g., limbic 
system) – i.e., the less sophisticated, older parts of the brain that is shared throughout the animal 
kingdom – might be important for this task, since it is highly attuned to competitive acts and 
identifying and responding to potential threat (e.g., see Trower & Gilbert, 1989). In support of 
this view, more recent theories that have linked cognitive and psychoevolutionary models of 
social anxiety (e.g., Weeks et al., 2009) place a central, causal role on upward social 
comparisons in triggering a class of submissive cognitions which contribute to the experience of 
social anxiety, depression, and self-protective behaviours such as social withdrawal.  
It appears, therefore, that threatening appraisals generated through social comparisons 
may be of crucial and even causal importance in the progression and maintenance of social 
anxiety symptoms. Taken together, there appears to be a maladaptive cycle wherein socially 
anxious individuals hold negative self-relevant beliefs and believe themselves to be inferior to 
others around them. On the basis of these beliefs, they also expect and predict negative social 
outcomes such as rejection or exclusion (much like the low-ranked member of an animal 
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hierarchy). This expectancy creates a heightened sense of threat during social interactions, and 
impedes actual social success. Importantly, it appears that individuals high in social anxiety may 
then appraise their own anxious cognitions, sensations, and behaviours as further evidence of 
their own inferiority and inadequacy. Further understanding this last component within the 
negative interpersonal cycle was one of the major aims of the current study: What appraisals do 
individuals with SAD make about what it means to display anxiety (and confidence), and how do 
these differ from the appraisals about anxiety and confidence made by healthy individuals? 
 Given the seeming importance of upward social comparison information to fuelling these 
cycles and maintaining anxiety, a central remaining question underlying the current study is how 
social comparison processes integrate salient information across self-relevant beliefs (e.g., that 
one’s anxiety is obvious to others and signals inferiority and weakness) and partner-relevant 
observations (i.e., seeing anxious or confident cues in social partners and appraising the meaning 
of these displays of anxiety or confidence). Under what circumstances does this information 
signal relative threat or safety in specific social interactions, and what kind of impact do such 
self-other comparisons have on predictions and interpersonal behaviour? 
If the presence of visible symptoms of anxiety is indeed seen as being particularly 
meaningful in the eyes of those with higher levels of social anxiety, an interesting question that 
follows is whether the absence of anxiety (or the presence of social confidence) is also seen as 
especially meaningful or informative in the eyes of those with social anxiety. With the exception 
of the 2013 study conducted by Bielak and Moscovitch (2013), no prior studies have examined 
the impact of observable social confidence (in addition to observable anxiety) on interpersonal 
evaluations and predictions in socially anxious participants.  The study conducted by Bielak and 
Moscovitch (2013), was designed to determine whether individuals with high social anxiety 
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differed from those low in social anxiety with respect to their appraisals of visibly anxious and 
visibly confident partners. Female undergraduate participants who were preselected as being 
either high (n = 60) or low (n = 59) in trait levels of social anxiety read a series of two vignettes 
describing a first encounter with an unfamiliar male student. In the first vignette, the male 
partner’s anxiety or confidence was left ambiguous, whereas in the follow-up vignette he was 
described as being either visibly anxious or confident. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one condition or the other. Participants provided ratings of the partner across five desirable 
characteristics (intelligence, happiness, strength of character, ambition, and achievements) before 
and again after receiving information indicating that the partner was either anxious or confident.  
Consistent with hypotheses, results supported the notion that socially anxious individuals’ 
evaluations of social partners were not entirely top-down or schema-driven but were, rather, 
quite sensitive to the presence of unambiguous cues signifying that interaction partners were 
either anxious or confident.  
 In the anxious partner condition, all participants judged the visibly anxious partner as 
being significantly less desirable relative to baseline ratings. Contrary to hypotheses, however, 
participants high in social anxiety did not perceive the anxious partner as being even less 
desirable than participants low in social anxiety. While these findings failed to replicate previous 
findings in which socially anxious participants tended to perceive the display of anxiety as more 
costly than non-socially anxious participants (e.g., Purdon et al., 2001; Roth et al., 2001), these 
results did mirror those of several other studies in which participants both high and low in social 
anxiety were shown to be similarly harsh in judging individuals who disclosed or displayed 
symptoms of anxiety within the social context (Ashbaugh, Antony, McCabe, Schmidt, & 
Swinson, 2005; Gee, Antony, Koerner, & Aiken, 2012). Irrespective of their own social anxiety 
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status, participants tended to negatively judge others who appear nervous during social 
interaction.  
 When social partners were depicted as being visibly confident, the desirability ratings 
reported by participants high in social anxiety increased significantly from baseline to 
postmanipulation (for both the composite Desirability Index and the individual attributes). In 
contrast, desirability ratings provided by participants low in social anxiety did not significantly 
change from baseline to postmanipulation for any of the attributes (with the exception of 
character strength). This pattern was interpreted as indicating that individuals with high levels of 
social anxiety have an idealized view of interpersonal confidence. Their tendency to associate 
social confidence with exaggerated worth across other (ostensibly unrelated) personal attributes 
may help to explain why socially anxious individuals typically compare themselves so 
unfavorably with potential or imagined social partners in their day-to-day social interactions 
(e.g., Antony et al., 2005). In contrast, participants low in social anxiety are probably aware from 
their own personal experiences and observation of others that visible social confidence is not 
necessarily perfectly predictive of  one’s standing in other domains, such as character strength or 
ambition. Socially anxious individuals, however, may jump to positively biased conclusions 
about confident others because they do not have access to contradicting information from their 
own personal experiences, and only aspire to be more like these confident counterparts. Thus, 
potential interaction partners who appear confident may be viewed by socially anxious 
individuals as being highly desirable, but also as embodying unreachable social standards. This 
bias appears to resemble or to be a specific subtype of the well-documented halo effect, wherein 
individuals possessing desirable attributes in one specific domain (e.g., physical attractiveness) 
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are perceived as possessing other, ostensibly unrelated desirable attributes such as kindness or 
intelligence (see Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijiani, & Longo, 1991).  
 This preliminary study raised a number of intriguing questions about both the nature of 
social anxiety and treatment implications for SAD, which served as the theoretical foundation for 
the current dissertation.  The results of the preliminary study described earlier (Bielak & 
Moscovitch, 2013) suggested that individuals with high vs. low levels of social anxiety react 
quite negatively to visibly anxious social partners. Given that Bielak and Moscovitch (2013) 
used ratings that were based on imagined interactions with an individual who was described in a 
hypothetical vignette, the current study was designed to examine whether this pattern of results 
would be replicated when a real potential social partner who exhibits visible signs of anxiety or 
confidence replaces the written vignette in which participants were instructed simply to imagine 
such cues.  
 The current study was aimed at examining whether such biases are observable in actual 
encounters with real, rather than imagined, social partners. In so doing, this study was designed 
to extend the understanding of the role of social comparisons in perpetuating negative beliefs and 
self-protective behaviours in social anxiety. The present study represents one of the first efforts 
to experimentally manipulate social comparisons in individuals with SAD in order to examine 
the causal impact of upward (versus same-level and downward) comparisons on social 
predictions and performance. The current study investigates how differing types of social 
comparisons influence the interpersonal attitudes and beliefs of individuals with SAD in advance 
of a socially threatening set of tasks (i.e., being asked to deliver a speech and anticipating a 
conversation with another participant whose speech you had previously watched).  
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In addition, this study was designed to explore whether visible anxiety versus confidence 
might moderate participants’ perception of the costs of social blunders committed by the anxious 
versus confident presenters. Previous research has found that individuals with high levels of 
social anxiety perceive social blunders as being more interpersonally costly, embarrassing, 
shameful, and likely to elicit negative reactions from others than similar blunders rated by 
participants low in social anxiety (e.g., Moscovitch, Rodebaugh, & Hesch, 2011). Some studies 
have also found that these harsher evaluations and more rigid standards are more pronounced 
when individuals with SAD are reflecting on their own behaviour versus that of others (e.g., 
Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998; Voncken, Alden, & Bögels, 2006). However, Moscovitch et al. 
(2011) found that socially anxious participants rated imagined blunders more harshly than low 
socially anxious individuals both when they envisioned the blunders occurring to themselves and 
to a third person. A possible explanation for this is that Moscovitch et al. (2011) did not control 
for the possibility that, when asked to imagine unknown “others” committing social blunders, 
individuals with high social anxiety may have simply projected their own expectations and 
biases onto the subject they were imagining. The approach chosen in the current study has 
controlled for this possible confound by providing an actual (rather than imagined) subject who 
is either anxious or confident for participants to imagine committing various social blunders, thus 
allowing us to extend previous research in this area. Specifically, if individuals with SAD indeed 
perceive confident individuals as having highly desirable attributes in general, as was found in 
the earlier study, this may lead these participants to make additional specific, positively biased 
predictions about the abilities of confident people to respond effectively to social blunders as 
compared to visibly anxious individuals, rendering such blunders, when committed by confident 
individuals, less costly than for anxious individuals. To this end, this study was aimed at 
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determining  whether the confident (as compared to the anxious) presenter was viewed by 
participants with SAD as being: (a) less likely to commit social blunders in the first place; (b) 
less likely to be embarrassed or experience strong feelings of shame as a result of committing 
blunders; (c) less likely to incur interpersonal costs as a result of their blunders by virtue of 
having high “social currency” (even though the blunders participants were asked to consider 
were identical in both conditions); and (d) more likely to take immediate, effective reparative 
action so as to minimize the lasting impact of the blunder. In this way, this study is designed to 
determine of whether individuals with SAD believe social blunders bear catastrophic 
consequences for everyone who commits them due to violating some rigid social norm, or 
whether there are factors that moderate the perceived impact of such a blunder on interpersonal 
status, such as whether one appears to be a confident or anxious person. 
The current study was designed to enable the study of self and other-evaluative processes 
and social comparisons in social anxiety, as well as their downstream effects on interpersonal 
predictions (e.g., desire for future interaction and perceived desire by another to interact with the 
self), negative and positive affect, and interpersonal behaviour. Participants with a principal or 
co-principal diagnosis of SAD (excluding the performance only subtype, according to the criteria 
of the DSM-5) as well as healthy control (HC) participants were invited to participate in a study 
examining first impressions. They were told that they would be watching a speech by another 
person (a fellow participant) and evaluating their first impressions of him, and then would 
produce a similar speech to be evaluated by the other participant. They were told to expect to 
meet the other participant for a 5-minute “getting to know you” conversation at the end of the 
study. In reality, all participants were randomly assigned to watch and evaluate one of two 
speeches (the content was scripted to be the same in both) created by the same confederate, one 
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in which he appeared anxious or another in which he appeared confident. Participants then 
delivered their own speeches which they believed would be similarly rated by the other 
participant (these were later coded by trained research assistants blind to participant group 
membership). Participants were then debriefed about the study purpose and hypotheses. A 
detailed description of the process undertaken for the creation and pilot testing of the stimulus 
speeches are provided in the Method section. As well, a visual schematic diagram of the study 
sequence is provided (Figure 1). Based on the extant literature, the following hypotheses were 
advanced: 
Hypotheses 
Anxiety, positive affect, and negative affect. 
1. Participants with SAD were expected to report more anxiety about future interactions than 
HCs overall, and participants with SAD in the confident presenter condition to report more 
anxiety about future interactions than participants with SAD in the anxious partner 
condition. 
2. Participants with SAD who were asked to contemplate giving their own speech following a 
confident presenter, as compared to those who watched an anxious presenter, were expected 
to report (i) increased negative, and (ii) decreased positive affect on the PANAS from 
baseline to the time of contemplating their upcoming speech.  
Desirability and desire for future interaction. 
3. Consistent with the previous study, both participants with SAD and HCs were expected to 
rate an anxious presenter as less desirable at postmanipulation relative to baseline. 
Participants with SAD, relative to HCs, were expected to show a more dramatic increase in 
INTERPERSONAL EXPECTANCIES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY  
 
32 
 
the presenter’s desirability at postmanipulation relative to baseline when the presenter 
appeared confident than when he appeared anxious. 
4. Participants with SAD were expected to indicate more desire for future interaction with the 
presenter who appeared anxious than the presenter who appeared confident; whereas HC 
participants were expected to desire more future interaction with the presenter who appeared 
confident as compared to a presenter who appeared anxious 
5. Participants with SAD were expected to anticipate a more negative response (i.e., less 
perceived desire for future interaction by the presenter with the participant) from the 
confident than the anxious presenter. Conversely, control participants were expected to 
anticipate a more positive response (i.e., more perceived desire for future interaction) from 
the confident than the anxious presenter. 
6. Participants with SAD, relative to controls, were expected to rate their own standing on 
desirable attributes as being lower than the speech presenter, irrespective of their assigned 
condition. Furthermore, participants with SAD in the confident presenter condition were 
expected to rate their own desirable self attributes as lower relative to the presenter than 
SAD participants in the anxious presenter condition.  
Social comparisons and their impact on desire for future interaction. 
7. Participants with SAD were expected to report more motivation  to engage in social 
comparisons in their daily lives, as indicated by higher scores on the INCOM questionnaire. 
8. The interaction between participant group and partner type was expected to lead to differing 
types of social comparisons for different combinations of participant and partner, and  social 
comparisons were expected to mediate the relationship between the group-by-condition 
interaction and the desire of the participant to interact with the speech presenter they were 
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assigned to watch. Specifically, individuals with SAD were expected to make more 
numerous upward comparisons with the confident presenter, and these upward comparisons 
were expected to lead them to desire less interaction with him, reflecting greater negative 
interpersonal expectancies about such an interaction and higher motivation to avoid such an 
interaction. Conversely, participants with SAD were expected to make same-level or 
downward comparisons with an anxious presenter and perceive such an interaction as more 
equal, less intimidating, and more “safe.”  HCs, on the other hand, were expected to make 
downward or same-level comparisons with the confident presenter and downward 
comparisons with the anxious presenter, and to desire more interaction with the confident 
presenter than the anxious one. 
Similarity and desire for future interaction. 
9. Participants with SAD were expected to see themselves as more similar to the anxious 
presenter, while HC participants were expected to see themselves as less similar to the same 
presenter at postmanipulation relative to baseline. In the confident presenter condition, HCs 
were expected to see themselves as more similar to the confident presenter and participants 
with SAD to see themselves as less similar. Moreover, a positive correlation was predicted 
between similarity and desire for future interaction ratings in the overall sample collapsed 
across both HCs and participants with SAD. 
Speech quality and Self-Portrayal Concerns. 
10. Participants with SAD who were asked to contemplate giving their own speech after 
watching a confident presenter, as compared to those who watched an anxious presenter, 
were expected to make more negative predictions about their own speech performance and 
to be more concerned about their negative self-attributes.  
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Costs of interpersonal blunders. 
11.  Participants with SAD and HC participants were not predicted to differ in their evaluations 
of the costs of imagined blunders for an anxious presenter, rating this presenter’s blunders 
as more numerous and more costly as compared to a confident presenter. Conversely, the 
groups were expected to differ in their ratings of the costs of blunders committed by a 
confident presenter in a pattern consistent with the findings from the initial study, with SAD 
participants rating the blunders of a confident presenter as less numerous and less costly, as 
compared to control participants. Furthermore, participants with SAD were expected to rate 
blunders as most costly across both conditions, relative to HCs. Finally, all participants were 
expected to rate the blunders committed by an anxious presenter as more costly relative to 
blunders committed by a confident presenter. 
Coded ratings of desirability. 
12. Coders were expected to rate participants with SAD in both conditions as less 
interpersonally desirable than HC participants. 
Coded ratings of speech quality. 
13. With regard to the speech quality of speeches produced by participants with SAD and 
controls in either of the two conditions, a main effect of group was predicted, such that 
speeches produced by HCs would be rated as being of higher quality relative to speeches 
produced by participants with SAD. As well, as a group by condition interaction was 
predicted, wherein participants with SAD in the confident presenter condition would receive 
even lower speech quality ratings than participants with SAD in the anxious presenter 
condition and relative to HCs in both conditions. 
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14. When directly comparing self and coder ratings of speech quality, it was predicted that 
participants with SAD would exaggerate the negative attributes and underemphasize the 
positive attributes of their own speeches in their own ratings, relative to ratings of the 
speeches provided by coders. 
Coded ratings of dominance and warmth. 
15. Participants with SAD were expected to be rated as less dominant and less warm in their 
recorded speeches, as compared to HCs. It was also predicted that participants with SAD in 
the confident partner condition would be rated as even less dominant and less warm than 
participants with SAD in the anxious partner condition.  
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety participants were recruited for the current study. Of these, 43 participants had a 
principal DSM-5 diagnosis of SAD. For participants with multiple diagnoses, the principal 
diagnosis was the one that was judged by the diagnostic interviewer as being the most distressing 
or interfering for the participant. Forty-seven healthy control (HC) participants were also 
recruited, all of whom denied experiencing significant current or past psychological difficulties.  
In the clinical sample of individuals with principal SAD, 81% (35 participants) were 
recruited through the Anxiety Studies Division (ASD) at the University of Waterloo Centre for 
Mental Health Research (CMHR), whereas the remaining 19% (8 participants) were recruited 
from the waitlist for therapy services at the CMHR. The CMHR is a comprehensive community 
mental health clinic located at the University of Waterloo, and the ASD is a research pool within 
the CMHR for nontreatment-seeking participants with anxiety difficulties. After data screening 
(see Data Screening section for details), 3 participants with SAD were excluded from any further 
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analysis. The resulting sample of participants with SAD (N = 40) was comprised of 72.5% 
females, and the mean age was 29.0 (SD 11.6) years, as outlined in Table 2. The sample was 
predominantly Caucasian (60%), Asian (25%), Black (10%), with the remaining 5% identifying 
as members of other ethnicities/racial groups.  
All participants in the clinical sample had a principal diagnosis of SAD, and the overall 
sample had a moderate severity, with a mean Clinical Severity Rating (CSR) of 5.3 (SD .72) on 
an 8-point scale and a CSR of 4 serving as the clinical cut-off, as per Brown and Barlow (2014). 
Principal diagnoses were those associated with the highest CSR ratings by virtue of clinician 
judgment that they were most interfering/distressing for participants. For participants for whom a 
second diagnosis was deemed to be equally interfering and distressing as the principal SAD 
diagnosis, a coprincipal diagnosis was noted. Participants for whom criteria were met for 
additional diagnoses at lower CSRs than SAD were considered to have additional diagnoses. It is 
noteworthy that these categories were not mutually exclusive, with a subset of participants 
having both co-principal and additional diagnoses. Seventy percent of the sample had coprincipal 
and/or additional diagnoses, with depressive disorders and other anxiety disorders the most 
common types of comorbid diagnoses.  Of the participants with SAD, 22.5% had a coprincipal 
depressive disorder and 12.5% had an additional depressive disorder diagnosis. Ten percent had 
a coprincipal diagnosis of another anxiety disorder and 30% had an additional anxiety disorder 
diagnosis. Please see Table 2 for more information. 
The timing of the current study coincided with the transition within the ASD and CMHR 
from using the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5. All of the clinical participants were assessed and 
diagnosed by trained graduate students using the Mini International Diagnostic Interview (MINI) 
version 6.00 for DSM-IV (Sheehan & Lecrubier, 2009) or MINI 7.00 for DSM-5 (Sheehan, 
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Harnett-Sheehan, Sheehan, & Gray, 2014), which were supplemented by sections from the 
Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule, ADIS-IV (Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994) and ADIS-
5 (Brown & Barlow, 2014). For participants who were assessed based on DSM-IV-TR criteria 
using the MINI 6.00 (prior to the transition to DSM-5 criteria) as having a principal diagnosis of 
Generalized SAD, a post-hoc review of their individual symptoms checklists was conducted 
based on the symptoms that were reported at their diagnostic interview to establish whether they 
would qualify for a diagnosis of SAD (excluding those with the Performance Only subtype) 
based on DSM-5 criteria. Potential participants were excluded if they endorsed active symptoms 
of mania or psychosis or significant suicidality.  
HC participants were recruited via advertising in the Kitchener-Waterloo community and 
on campus at the University of Waterloo. Potentially eligible control participants were 
administered an online version of the MINI 6.00 Screener. Participants who denied any current 
or past psychological difficulties were invited to participate in the study. After the data were 
screened (see Data Screening section), the data from 5 HCs was excluded from any further 
analysis. The resulting sample of HCs (N = 42) was comprised of individuals who denied any 
current psychological difficulties. This group was 61.9% female, had a mean age of 23.7 (SD 
8.95) years, and were predominantly Caucasian (57.5%), Asian (40 %), and Black (2.5%). Please 
see Table 2 for more information. 
Measures 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
The PANAS is a 20-item rating scale containing 10 adjectives representing positive affect, and 
10 adjectives representing negative affect. While the PANAS can be used to rate emotional 
experiences either in the present or recent past, the PANAS was used as a present-focused state 
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measure of affective experiences. Participants rated each item on a 5-point Likert scale to 
represent their affective experiences in the present moment. The PANAS is a widely used 
measure of affective experiences with strong psychometric properties (e.g., Cronbach’s alphas of 
.84-.90 in the original sample; for a review of relevant literature, see Sloan & Kring, 2007). In 
the present study, the Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .88 to .90 for the positive subscale across 
the three time points, and from .88 to .89 for the negative subscale. 
Partner Desirability Ratings (Bielak & Moscovitch, 2013). Participants rated the 
speech presenter on the following five characteristics: character strength, achievements, 
happiness, intelligence, and ambition. These were chosen to be identical to the list used in the 
initial study described earlier (Bielak & Moscovitch, 2013), so that results from the two 
experiments could be compared directly. Participants rated how much they believed the 
interaction partner possessed each item in comparison to the average person, from -3 (“much less 
than average”) to 3 (“much more than average”). As was the case in the earlier study, these 
ratings were used to calculate a Desirability Index (an average desirability score across these five 
unique attributes) on which to base the desirability analyses. In the current study, the Desirability 
Index showed good internal consistency, with Cronbach alphas of .85 and .81 in the anxious and 
confident presenter conditions at baseline, and .80 and .91 for the anxious and confident 
presenter conditions at postmanipulation.  
 Desire for Future Interaction Scale (DFI; Coyne, 1976). The DFI is a measure that 
participants used to rate their desire to interact further with the presenter across eight distinct 
interpersonal situations (e.g., sitting next to him on the bus, working with him). Each statement is 
rated from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much so”).  It is generally considered a measure of 
interpersonal liking or the acceptability of another person as an interaction partner (e.g., Voncken 
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& Dijk, 2013). It has been used widely in studies examining the interpersonal consequences of 
SA. In the present study the DFI was used in two distinct ways: (a) the measure in its typical 
form was administered to serve as a measure of participant desire for future interaction of the 
speech presenters; and (b) the items on the DFI were reversed to ask about the perceived desire 
of the target person (speech presenter) to interact with the self. In this way, this modified version 
served as a measure of participant perception of the speech presenter’s desire to interact with the 
self. In the present study, the DFI showed strong internal consistency across both forms 
(Cronbach’s alphas of .85-.87).  
Similarity between Speech Presenter and the Self. A 3-item measure assessing 
perceived similarity between the self and the speech presenter globally was administered. The 
three items were previously used by Papsdorf and Alden (1998) to measure similarity to the self. 
The similarity scale has been shown to have strong psychometric properties (e.g., Cronbach’s 
alphas > .92 in Papsdorf & Alden, 1998, and Voncken et al., 2008). In the present study, the brief 
measure demonstrated acceptable internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .67.  
Perception of Speech Performance Questionnaire (PSP; Rapee & Lim, 1992). The 
PSP questionnaire assesses perceived performance across a number of domains important in 
public speaking. There are two subscales, one assessing positive speech qualities (e.g., “made a 
good impression”) and another assessing negative qualities (e.g., “stuttered”). In the current 
study, the PSP was used three times: (1) for participants to assess their predicted performance on 
the upcoming speech task, (2) for participants to assess their own recently completed speech, and 
(3) for coders to assess the quality of participant video recorded speeches. The PSP has been 
shown to have adequate to strong psychometric properties (e.g., Cronbach’s alphas in the .79-.86 
range for the various subscales in the original sample). In the present study, both the positive and 
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negative subscales of the PSP showed excellent internal consistency at both baseline (Cronbach’s 
alphas of .80 for the positive subscale and .90 for the negative subscale) as well as 
postmanipulation (Cronbach’s alphas of .93 for the positive subscale and .89 for the negative 
subscale). 
 Ratings of own desirability compared to the speech presenter. The same set of five 
desirable attributes (see Presenter Desirability Measure above) was compiled into a measure of 
self-rated desirability as compared to the speech presenter. On the same domains of desirability 
on which they rated the presenter, participants were asked to rate themselves as compared 
directly to the speech presenter (e.g., ambition, strength of character, etc.). Higher values 
indicated more favourable ratings of the self relative to the presenter. In the present study, this 
measure showed excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of .92). 
Modified Blunders Task. The Blunders Task (Moscovitch, Rodebaugh, & Hesch, 2012) 
evaluates participant reactions to imagined social blunders committed by themselves and by 
others. In the present study, four blunders were selected from the originally ones used by 
Moscovitch et al. (2012). The blunders chosen for use in the current study included situations 
that could be experienced by both students and nonstudent adults, rather than situations that 
specifically occur in a college/university context. Participants were asked to imagine observing 
the speech presenter committing these blunders, and to respond to several questions related to 
their reactions to the blunder. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which the presenter 
would see the blunder as embarrassing, shameful, socially costly and likely to elicit negative 
reactions from others (these were the same four outcomes assessed by Moscovitch et al., 2012). 
In the modified version of the Blunders Task, participants were also asked questions to assess 
how much they believed this or similar types of blunders typically occur in the presenter’s life, to 
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what extent they thought the speech presenter would be able to take corrective action (e.g., 
making a joke, a sincere apology) to successfully repair the situation and minimize the impact of 
the blunder, and their perception of the lasting social cost of the blunder for the presenter. A 
single composite score was created across the four blunders by adding the totals across each 
individual blunder. The composite is intended to represent the social probability and cost of 
social blunders for each participant. In the present study, the composite score showed strong 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of .95). 
Warmth and Dominance Ratings. Video coders were asked to rate the warmth and 
dominance of each of the study participants after watching the speeches recorded in the study 
session. Warmth and dominance were each rated on a 1-item Likert scale (e.g., from -3 “cold” to 
3 “warm”, and from -3 “submissive” to 3 “dominant”).  
Negative Self-Portrayal Scale (NSPS; Moscovitch & Huyder, 2011). The NSPS is a 
27-item questionnaire designed to assess participants’ concerns that specific self-attributes that 
they view as flawed or deficient will be exposed to scrutiny and evaluation by critical others in 
social situations. Each attribute (e.g., stuttering, sweating, being poorly dressed) is rated on a 
scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”) in terms of the concern about displaying this 
attribute in social situations. The NSPS has been shown in previous studies (e.g., Moscovitch & 
Huyder, 2011) to tap into three main domains of concern: physical appearance, signs of anxiety, 
and social competence. In the current study, the instructions were modified slightly, and 
participants were asked to complete the NSPS in reference to self-relevant attributes they were 
concerned about revealing over the course of the upcoming speech task. The NSPS showed 
excellent internal consistency in the current study (Cronbach’s alpha of .96 for the Total score).  
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Iowa-Netherlands Social Comparison Orientation Scale (INCOM; Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999). The INCOM is an 11-item scale on which participants rate their interest in 
seeking social comparison information as well as tendencies to engage in social comparisons. 
Participants provide responses ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”) for 
each statement (e.g., “I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have 
accomplished in life”). The scale shows good psychometric properties (e.g., Cronbach’s alpha of 
.83 in the original sample published by Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Since its publication, the 
INCOM has been used extensively to study social comparison behaviors across a wide range of 
samples, including clinical populations such as individuals with dysphoria (e.g., Giordano, 
Wood, & Michela, 2000), as well as eating disorders (e.g., Morrison, Waller, Meyer, Burditt, 
Wright, Babbs, & Gilbert, 2003). The INCOM was completed by participants during the present 
studyto provide a descriptive exploration of the differences in social comparison orientation 
between those with SAD and HCs. In the present study, the INCOM demonstrated acceptable 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of .70). 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000).  The SPIN is a 17-item self-
report instrument that measures fear, avoidance, and physiological discomfort in social situations 
(e.g.,fear of people in authority; avoids parties; distressed by sweating). Each item is rated on a 
scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 4 (“extremely”). The full scale score ranges from 0 to 68. The SPIN 
has been shown to be an excellent measure of social anxiety symptoms, has good test-retest 
reliability, strong convergent and divergent validity, good construct validity, and high levels of 
internal consistency (Antony, Coons, McCabe, Ashbaugh, & Swinson, 2006; Connor et al., 
2000). In the current study, the SPIN was administered at the end of the experiment. The data of 
participants were excluded from analysis if their in-session SPIN scores fell 2 or more standard 
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deviations above or below the mean for their respective groups (see Table 6 for group means and 
standard deviations). For this reason, the data of five participants (3 SAD participants and 2 
HCs) were excluded. Thus, the final sample consisted of 40 SAD participants with a mean SPIN 
score of 40 (range: 25-65) and 42 HC participants with a SPIN mean score of 11 (range: 1-24). 
These scores are very consistent with mean scores for individuals with SAD and healthy samples 
in other studies. For example, Connor et al. (2000) reported that their nonpsychiatric control 
group had a mean SPIN total score of 12.1. Connor et al. (2000) also proposed a cut-off score of 
19 and higher to select participants likely to have SAD, and other investigators have used cut-off 
scores of 30 and above (e.g., Moscovitch, Rodebaugh, & Hesch, 2012). The mean and range of 
the sample of participants with SAD appears to be consistent with these guidelines. The SPIN 
showed excellent internal consistency in the present sample (Cronbach’s alpha of .96).  
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21 item version (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) Depression Subscale. The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report measure divided 
into three subscales designed to assess anxiety, depression, and stress. The DASS-21 depression 
subscale was used as a brief measure of depressed mood, primarily to ensure that the two groups 
(HCs and SADs) differed in the expected ways in terms of their ratings of depressive symptoms, 
as well as to ensure that across the two conditions, members of the same group showed did not 
differ significantly in their levels of depression (i.e., SADs in the confident and anxious partner 
conditions should show similar levels of depressive symptoms, as should HCs across the two 
experimental conditions)  The depression subscale of the DASS-21 showed good internal 
consistency in the present sample (Cronbach’s alpha of .81).  
Confederate (“Presenter”) Training and Construction of Videos across Conditions 
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All participants in this study watched one of two pre-recorded speeches created by a 
trained research confederate. The confederate was a graduate student in his mid-20’s and was 
chosen to reflect a plausible research participant in terms of age and appearance. He was also 
selected due to having past recreational acting experience. He was trained on how to appear 
visibly socially anxious and confident.  The training of the confederate and speech content was 
based on the approach used by Ashbaugh et al. (2005). The speech topic and content were kept 
as consistent as possible across the two conditions. In the current study, the recorded speeches 
were on the topic “Places to see in the Kitchener-Waterloo area”. This was chosen as being a 
neutral topic not related to anxiety or psychology, and similar to the topic of “visiting Paris” that 
was used by Ashbaugh et al. (2005). For the visibly anxious condition, the confederate was 
trained to display interpersonal behaviours consistent with the experience of social anxiety, 
including appearing tense, fidgeting, speaking in a soft or uncertain tone of voice, pausing 
conspicuously, and reducing direct eye contact with the camera (see Moscovitch & Huyder, 
2011; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993, Taylor & Alden, 2005; Taylor & Alden, 2011;). 
For the confident speech, the confederate was trained to display calm and confident (but not 
cocky or arrogant) behaviours. He was trained to show behaviours that were opposite to those 
used in the visibly anxious speech, including speaking in a clear, animated tone and minimizing 
excessive pauses, appearing relaxed and using appropriate hand-gestures, and maintaining strong 
eye contact with the camera.  
Prior to running the study, pilot ratings for the two confederate videos were collected 
from 11 volunteer raters, who were friends and family members of the author who responded to 
an appeal for raters posted on the author’s social media (Facebook) page. Individuals were only 
included if they did not have any knowledge of the current dissertation research focus, study 
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design, or research questions. In order to confirm that the two videos differed on expected 
variables, such as presenter anxiety, warmth, nervousness, friendliness, and likeability, each of 
the 11 raters (8 females and 3 males; mean age = 29.81, SD = 6.78) watched and rated only one 
of the two videos, rating a number of attributes on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
Raters were blind to the purpose, procedure, or expected results of the current study. For the pilot 
ratings, participants also rated how real, natural, or believable the individual in the video 
appeared. Means and SDs, as well as independent-samples t-tests comparing the confident and 
anxious videos are presented in Table 1. As expected, participants rated the visibly anxious 
speech presenter as less calm, less warm, less likeable, less friendly, less confident, and less 
happy than the confident speech presenter. As expected, they also rated the anxious speech 
presenter as more nervous and anxious than the confident one. The two videos did not differ on 
ratings of intelligence and competence. Finally, the presenter in the confident video was rated as 
behaving more realistically/naturally (i.e., without pretense) than the same presenter in the 
anxious videos (Ms = 2.45 and 4.18, respectively on a 0-5 scale). Nonetheless, both videos were 
rated as being at least moderately natural/realistic across these raters. 
Procedure: Overview 
The current study was advertised to potential participants as a study about the ways 
individuals made first impressions of new people they encounter, and factors that influence these 
impressions. Upon arrival for the present study, participants were asked to provide baseline 
negative and positive affect ratings on the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Following completion of the PANAS, participants were told that the current study examines how 
people evaluate others whom they meet for the first time. They were told that to examine initial 
evaluations, they were paired at random with another study participant who started the study 15 
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minutes earlier, and was in the process of recording a short (approximately 3-minute) video of 
himself that the participant would be asked to watch. Participants were informed that they would 
be asked to evaluate the other participant’s speech, and that after they do this they would record 
their own speech which would likewise be evaluated by the other participant. Finally, 
participants were told that that at the very end of the study, they would get to meet the other 
participant for a short (5-minute) “getting to know you” conversation. 
In reality, the video presented to participants was one of two pre-recorded, standardized 
videos prepared in advance by a research confederate, as described above.  
Detailed Procedure 
At the onset of the study following scripted instructions were conveyed to participants: 
For the current study, participants have been randomly paired in advance of the study, 
and you will take turns watching each other’s short speeches and evaluating them. Your partner 
was chosen to be evaluated first, so his study session began earlier than yours, and he has 
recorded a short speech for you to watch and evaluate. Then, you will complete your own speech 
for him to watch and evaluate. For the first task, I will ask you to watch this speech and provide 
some ratings about the speech presenter and the quality of his speech. Before I let you watch the 
other participant’s speech, I will just show you his picture and ask you to answer a few questions 
about your first impressions of him. Please remember that at the end of today’s study session, 
you will meet the other participant for a short “getting to know you” task. 
All participants were presented with a picture of the male presenter (“Daniel”) and were 
told the title of the speech he will be presenting (“places to see in the Kitchener-Waterloo area”). 
Participants complete the baseline ratings of presenter desirability based solely on this 
information. For the baseline desirability ratings (completed prior to watching the presenter’s 
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speech), participants were asked to predict how the presenter would perform on the speech task 
and make general “first impression” ratings of him solely based on his picture. The researcher 
left the room while participants completed these (and all subsequent sets of) ratings. When 
participants had completed the ratings, the researcher returned to provide the following 
instructions: 
Now you will watch the other participant’s speech. While you watch this speech, please 
keep in mind that you will soon meet the presenter for the first time, and you will have a 
conversation with him in which you will have a chance to get to know one another briefly. With 
this in mind, please watch and judge the quality of his speech according to the questions 
provided.    
As stated above, participants were randomly assigned to watch a 3-minute video of a 
speech that was prepared earlier by a confederate in which the presenter appeared visibly anxious 
or confident. 
Following the video, participants completed the postmanipulation set of presenter 
desirability ratings (described above). Participants were then instructed to deliver their own 
video recorded speech under the threat of observation and future interaction with the presenter. 
(In reality, the speeches were recorded and later coded by trained research assistants, and the 
interaction with the other presenter did not actually occur, although participants were deceived to 
believe it would; participants were fully debriefed about this at the end of the study.) 
As participants prepared for giving their own speech, they responded to a series of 
questions assessing their level of anxiety and comparing their anticipated performance on the 
upcoming speech as compared to the other participant’s speech. Specifically, participants were 
given the following instructions: 
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Now please take the next 3 minutes to think about your upcoming speech, which will be on the 
topic “places to see in the Greater Toronto Area.” Remember that your speech will be evaluated 
by the other participant before the two of you get a chance to interact at the end of the study. 
Please think about what the other participants might expect from your speech performance, and 
how well you think you will do on the speech task as compared to the speech you watched 
earlier. Here are a few questionnaires for you to answer while you think about your upcoming 
speech.  
Participants then completed the PSP with reference to their own upcoming speech task. 
Participants also completed the NSPS as well as rerating their current negative and positive 
affect on the PANAS prior to giving their own speech.  
Participants were then asked to perform their own 3-minute speech on the topic “places to 
see in the Greater Toronto Area”. This is a topic that is meant to be similar to the presenter’s 
speech topic and one which thought to be relatable for most people. The speech was video 
recorded by the researcher. Following performing their own speech, participants completed the 
PANAS questionnaire once more, as well as the Blunders Task. For the Blunders Task, 
participants were instructed to imagine that the speech presenter had experienced each of the 
blunders when responding to the questions related to each blunder. 
Participants were then asked three questions to determine their level of suspicion or belief 
in the experimental deception, consistent with the Funnel Debriefing approach used by others 
(Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). They were asked the following questions, in the order below: (1) 
What are your thoughts about the study so far? (2) What is the purpose of the current study? (3) 
Was there anything strange or suspicious about the study? Each participant was given a score 
from 0 (no suspicion) to 2 (significant suspicion). Participants who obtained a score of 2, 
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indicating that they were confident that there was deception involved in the study (e.g., that the 
other participant did not exist or that the purpose was different from what they were told) were 
excluded from the study. Three participants from the original sample of 90 were excluded for 
this reason. 
Coding of Participant Videos by Blind Raters 
Two trained raters, one male and one female, watched and coded each of the videos that 
study participants created over the course of the study. The goal of this task was to determine, 
first, whether the behavioural performance in videos generated by participants with SAD differed 
systematically from those created by HCs, and second, whether being assigned to create a 
recorded speech following watching a confident (as compared to anxious) video affected 
participants with SAD (and HCs) differently in terms of the quality of their produced speech. 
The two video raters were undergraduate research assistants not otherwise involved in this study. 
Raters were blind to the diagnostic status (SAD or HC) of participants. They were trained by the 
author to code the presenter’s attributes using many of the same measures that participants used 
to evaluate the confederate videos (described in detail in the Confederate Training and 
Construction of Videos Across Conditions section, above). These included: presenter 
desirability, desire for future interaction with the presenter (DFI), perceived similarity between 
the self and the presenter, perception of speech performance (PSP), and the modified Blunders 
Task. 
In order to determine the level of agreement between the two raters across these 
variables, Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC; Consistency) were calculated. These are 
presented in Table 3. The consistency definition of the ICCexamines to what extent the raters 
provided a similar pattern of ratings). The goal was to determine whether the ratings were similar 
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enough to be collapsed across raters. Fleiss (1981) and Cicchetti and Sparrow (1981) 
recommended considering ICC values of between .6 and .74 as “good” agreement and values 
above .75 as “excellent” agreement. Analyses and interpretations were limited to those variables 
that exhibited ICC (Consistency) values above .60. These included Desirability Index (ICC of 
.72), DFI (ICC of .76), positive and negative subscales of the PSP (ICC of .89 and .83 
respectively), warmth and dominance (ICC of .74 and .81 respectively), and Blunders Composite 
(ICC of .74).  
Data Screening 
The data were screened for deviations from normality using visual inspection of Q-Q 
plots, examination of the absolute values of skewness and kurtosis, as well as with the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test of normality. Lei and Lomax (2005) recommend the following 
ranges when examining absolute values of skewness and kurtosis: values between 0 and 1.0 
indicate minimal nonnormality, values of 1.0-2.3 indicate moderate nonnormality, and values 
above 2.4 are suggestive of severe deviation from normality within a specific variable. As well, 
significant p-values associated with the K-S test are also suggestive of significant deviations 
from normality. However, Field (2009) indicated that the test can yield statistically significant 
values even when there are no practically significant deviations from normality. The skewness, 
kurtosis, and K-S test values for the key variables in the current study are presented in Table 4. 
Using the ranges suggested by Lei and Lomax (2005), no variables had severe skew. However, 
three variables had significant positive kurtosis. Positive kurtosis suggests that the distribution 
deviates from normality by being unusually “peaked” at the centre, as well as having a higher 
than usual proportion of its distribution in the tails (DeCarlo, 1997), in comparison to the normal 
distribution. All three instances of significant kurtosis were in symptom measure variables, 
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which would not necessarily be expected to be normally distributed in the two groups of clinical 
participants (SADs) or completely healthy populations (HCs). Given the specific instances of 
positive kurtosis in the current study, it seems probable, for example, that the positive kurtosis of 
the values of the negative affect subscale of the PANAS (both at baseline and at post-speech) 
around a very low mean on that subscale convey important information about the way PANAS 
(negative affect) scores are distributed. Given this rationale, which is supported by emerging 
concern among methodologists about the impact of data transformation on type I and II errors 
and data interpretability (e.g., see Garcia-Perez, 2012), it was decidedto leave the data 
untransformed and treat the results as tentative in analyses where nonnormality was a significant 
concern. 
Finally, outlier analyses were conducted on each of the variables of interest separately for 
the HC and SAD participant groups. Specific analyses cases that had z-scores more extreme than 
2 SDs above or below the means (calculated separately for each group). Instances in which 
outliers were excluded from specific analyses for this reason are identified in the relevant results 
section. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Sample characteristics. Participant groups and conditions were first compared across 
several demographic and symptom indices using a 2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: anxious, 
confident) two-way between-groups Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Means and SDs for these 
variables are provided in Table 2. 
 With respect to participant age, there was a main effect of group, such that participants 
with SAD were slightly older than HC participants
1
, F(1,78) = 5.56, p = .02,p =.07. There was 
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no main effect of partner type, F(1,78) = .03, p = .86,p= 0. There was no group by partner type 
interaction, F(1,78) = .50, p = .48, ,p= 0. 
 With respect to gender, the proportions of female (vs. male) participants are provided in 
Table 2. A Chi-Square test of Independence revealed no association between gender and study 
group or condition, χ2(3) = 2.08, p = .56. 
 With respect to ethnicity, participants were asked to select their ethnicity from the 
following five categories: Caucasian, Asian, Black, Latino, and other. A Chi-Square Test of 
Independence revealed no association between participant ethnicity and group or condition, 
χ2(12) = 10.77, p = .55. 
 Baseline symptom measures. Participant scores on the Social Phobia Inventory were 
compared using a two-way between groups 2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: anxious, 
confident) ANOVA. There was a main effect of Group, F(1,78) = 393.42, p < .001, p = .84, 
with  SAD participants reporting significantly higher SPIN scores than HCs. There was no 
statistically significant main effect of partner type, F(1,78) = 2.38, p =.13, p= .03, nor a group 
by partner type interaction, F (1,78) =.03, p = .88, p= 0. 
Participant groups also differed in the expected direction on the depression subscale of 
the DASS-21, which served as a brief measure of low mood. A two-way between-groups 2 
(group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: anxious presenter, confident presenter) ANOVA was 
conducted comparing scores on this subscale across the two groups and conditions. Participants 
with SAD had higher DASS-21 depression scores, F(1,58) = 34.46, p <.001, p = .37. There 
was no main effect of condition, F(1,58) = .40, p =.53, p <.01, nor a group by condition 
interaction, F(1,58) = .05, p =.83, p= 0. 
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 Anxiety. Participants with SAD were expected to report more anxiety about future 
interactions overall as compared to controls, and participants with SAD in the confident 
presenter condition were expected to report even more anxiety about future interactions than 
participants with SAD in the anxious partner condition. The first part of this hypothesis was 
supported. A two-way between-groups 2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: anxious presenter, 
confident presenter) ANOVA with anxiety about interacting with the presenter entered as the 
dependent variable revealed a strong main effect of group, F(1,78) = 54.90, p <.001, p =.47, 
with participants with SAD reporting higher levels of anxiety about interaction with the presenter 
than HCs. However, there was neither a main effect of condition, F(1,78) =.52, p = .48,p <.01, 
nor a group by condition interaction, F(1,78) =.94, p =.34, p = .01.  
Positive and Negative Affect. With respect to changes in positive and negative affect, 
participants with SAD who were asked to contemplate giving their own speech following a 
confident presenter, as compared to those who watched an anxious presenter, were expected to 
report (i) increased negative, and (ii) decreased positive affect on the PANAS from baseline to 
the time of contemplating their upcoming speech. To test this hypothesis, a 2 (group: SAD, HC) 
by 2 (condition: anxious presenter, confident presenter) by 3 (time: baseline, pre-speech, post-
speech) three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the positive and negative affect 
subscales of the PANAS separately. With respect to negative affect, there was a significant main 
effect of time, F(2,156) = 40.34, p <.001, p=. 34), a significant main effect of group, F(1,78) 
=160.19, p < .001, p = .67), and  a significant time by group interaction F(2,156) = 18.16, p 
<.001, p = 19. There was no condition by time interaction, F(2,156) = .02, p = .98, 

p = 0, 
nor a condition by time by group interaction, F(2,156) = .70, p = .50, p < .01. Follow-up 
independent-samples t-tests conducted on negative affect scores at each time point revealed that 
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SAD participants were higher in negative affect across all time points than HCs (t’s > 8.60, p’s 
<.001). In addition, while both groups experienced an increase in negative affect from baseline to 
the pre-speech time point (t’s > 4.70, p’s < .001), the post-speech scores for HCs no longer 
differed from their baseline scores, t(41) = 1.25, p =.22. Conversely, the post-speech scores for 
participants with SAD were still significantly higher than baseline, t(39) = 4.34, p < .001. 
Independent samples t-tests confirmed that there were no statistically significant differences 
between participants with SAD in the two conditions at any of the time points (t’s < .79, p’s > 
.44). Thus, the hypothesis that giving a speech following a confident presenter (as opposed to an 
anxious one) would lead to more negative affect in the SAD group was not supported. 
With respect to positive affect, a different pattern of results emerged. There was a 
significant main effect of time, F(2,77) = 9.02, p < .001,p = .19. There was also aa time by 
group interaction that approached statistical significance, F(2,77) = 2.93, p = .06, p = .07. 
There was not a significant time by condition interactions, F(2,77) = .02, p =.98, p <.01, nor a 
group by time by condition interaction, F(2,77) = .21, p =.83, p = .0. Given the marginally 
significant group by time interaction, changes in positive affect across the three time points were 
examined separately in each of the presenter conditions. Follow-up independent samples t-tests 
revealed that at all time points, there were significant or nearly significant differences between 
HCs and participants with SAD, with HCs reporting more positive affect (t’s > 1.83, p’s < .071). 
In addition, while the positive affect scores on the PANAS for HC participants did not change 
significantly from baseline to pre-speech, t(41) =.23, p = .82, nor from baseline to post-speech, 
t(41) = 1.56, p =.13, the positive affect scores of participants with SAD dropped significantly 
from baseline to pre-speech t(39) = 3.8, p <.001, and remained significantly lower than baseline 
at post-speech, t(39) = 4.20, p <.001. As was the case with negative affect, however, there was 
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no significant main effect of condition nor interaction between condition and either of the other 
variables. T-tests confirmed that there were no differences in positive affect among participants 
with SAD in the anxious vs. confident presenter conditions at any of the time points (t’s <.67, p’s 
> .51). Thus, the hypothesis that giving a speech following a confident presenter (as opposed to 
an anxious one) would lead to the experience of less positive affect in the SAD group was not 
supported.  
Desirability of anxious and confident presenters. With respect to the desirability of the 
anxious and confident presenters, a pattern of results consistent with the earlier study (Bielak & 
Moscovitch, 2013) was expected to emerge, wherein both participants with SAD and HCs were 
expected to rate an anxious presenter as less desirable at postmanipulation relative to baseline, 
and participants with SAD, relative to HCs, would show a more dramatic increase from baseline 
in their ratings of the presenter’s desirability at postmanipulation when the presenter appears 
confident, resulting in a group by time interaction. Planned contrasts were used to examine 
change in Desirability Index scores (average desirability ratings across the five attributes of 
intelligence, ambition, achievement, happiness, and strength of character) in each of the two 
experimental conditions separately. Please see Figures 2 and 3. The results of 2 (time: baseline, 
postmanipulation) by 2 (group: SAD, HC) planned contrasts partially supported hypotheses. In 
the anxious partner condition, as in the previous study, there was a main effect of time, F(1, 38) 
= 6.15, p = .02, p = .14, but no effect of group, F(1,38) = .21, p = .65, 

p = .01, and no group 
by time interaction, F (1,38) = .02, p = .89, p = .00. Across both groups, participants rated an 
anxious speaker as less desirable at postmanipulation relative to baseline. In the confident partner 
condition, a complementary pattern emerged within the Desirability Index ratings. Again, a main 
effect of time emerged, F(1,39) = 37.87, p <.001,  p = .49). Unlike the previous study, there 
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was no significant main effect of group, F(1,39) = .33, p <.57,  p = .01, nor group by time 
interaction, F(1,39) = 1.23, p =.27,  p = .03. In the current study, participants across both 
groups evaluated the confident speaker as more desirable at postmanipulation relative to 
baseline. 
Desire for future interaction. It was expected that participants with SAD would indicate 
more desire for future interaction with the presenter who appears anxious than the presenter who 
appears confident, whereas control participants would desire more future interaction with the 
presenter who appears confident. To determine the impact of condition and group on desire for 
future interaction, 2 (time: baseline, postmanipulation) x2 (group: SAD, HC) planned contrasts 
were used in each of the conditions separately. The pattern of results that emerged was quite 
inconsistent with these hypotheses. In the anxious partner condition, there was no significant 
effect of time, F(1,38) = .15, p =.70,  p = 0, but there was a significant time by group 
interaction, F(1,38) = 5.86, p =.02,  p = .13. Follow-up paired t-tests revealed that while HCs 
rated their desire for future interaction with the anxious presenter lower at postmanipulation as 
compared to baseline, t(20) = 2.47, p = .02, participants with SAD did not report a similar drop 
in their desire for future interaction, t(18) = 1.20, p = .24. In the confident partner condition, 
there was a significant main effect of time, F(1,39) = 51.86, p <.001,  p = .57, but no 
significant interaction between time and group, F(1,39) = 2.71, p =.11,  p = .07. The ratings of 
desire for future interaction with a confident presenter for both groups increased significantly 
from baseline to postmanipulation, t’s > 4.94, p’s <.001. In summary, both groups desired more 
interaction with a confident presenter relative to their baseline scores, but only HCs (and not 
participants with SAD) reported a drop in their desire for future interaction with the anxious 
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presenter. Overall, both groups desired significantly more interaction with the confident 
presenter than the anxious one, t’s > 2.34, p’s < .03.  
Perceived desire for future interaction with the self. It was predicted that SAD 
participants would expect a more negative response (i.e., less perceived desire for future 
interaction by the presenter with the participant) from the confident than the anxious presenter, 
whereas control participants would expect a more positive response (i.e., more perceived desire 
for future interaction) from the confident than the anxious presenter. Planned contrasts in each 
condition separately revealed a pattern of results that differed from the one hypothesized. In both 
conditions, there were significant main effects of group, with SAD participants believing the 
presenters desired less interaction with them as compared to HC participants (F’s > 6.59, p’s 
<.02,p > .14 ). In the anxious partner condition, there was a main effect of time, F(1,38) = 
7.46, p <.01,p = .16. Both groups experienced a significant drop in their perception of the 
anxious presenter’s desire to interact further with them. There was no significant group by time 
interaction, F(1,38) = .24, p = .63, p =.01. In the confident partner condition, there was no 
significant main effect of time, F(1,39) = .07, p = .79, p =.01, but there was a group by time 
interaction approaching statistical significance, F(1,39) = 3.40, p = .07, p = .08. To better 
understand this interaction, paired-samples t-tests were conducted within each group separately, 
comparing baseline and postmanipulation scores of perceived desire for future interaction. 
Neither participants with SAD nor controls experienced a significant change in their perceived 
desire for future interaction relative to baseline (t’s < 1.45, p’s > .17). In summary, both groups 
rated an anxious presenter as less likely to desire interaction with them at postmanipulation as 
compared to baseline. Conversely, the perceived desire of the confident presenter to interact with 
the self did not significantly change from baseline to postmanipulation. 
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Social comparisons between the speech presenter and self. It was hypothesized that 
participants with SAD, relative to HCs, would rate their own standing on desirable attributes as 
being lower than that of the speech presenter, irrespective of their assigned condition. 
Furthermore, it was expected that participants with SAD in the confident presenter condition 
would rate their own desirable self attributes as lower relative to the presenter, compared to SAD 
participants in the anxious presenter condition, resulting in a group by condition interaction. A 2 
(group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: anxious presenter, confident presenter) two-way between-
groups ANOVA was conducted to examine the impact of group and condition on comparisons 
with the speech presenter. There was a main effect of group, F(1,78) =15.82, p <.001, p = .16, 
with HCs consistently providing higher self ratings than participants with SAD. There was also a 
main effect of condition, F(1,78) = 10.82, p =.002, p=12, with participants in the anxious 
presenter condition rating themselves higher as compared to those in the confident presenter 
condition. There was no significant group by condition interaction, F(1,78) =.87, p = .35, p = 
.01. Independent samples post-hoc t-tests conducted within the two conditions separately 
comparing self-comparison ratings of HCs and participants with SAD revealed that although in 
both conditions participants with SAD tended to compare themselves with the presenters less 
favourably than HCs, in the anxious presenter condition there was only a marginally significant 
difference between the average ratings of the self as compared to the anxious speech presenter, 
t(39) = 1.89, p = .07. Conversely, when rating the self as compared to a confident presenter, there 
was a significant difference between participants with SAD and HCs, t(29.4) = 4.10, p < .001, 
with HCs seeing themselves as superior to the presenter, while participants with SAD rating 
themselves as inferior to him. 
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 In order to better understand the types of social comparisons in which participants with 
SAD and HCs engaged in each condition, the frequencies of upward, same-level, and downward 
social comparisons were examined and compared. Please see Figure 4. In order to determine 
whether the condition impacted the type of comparison in which individuals engaged, an index 
of each participant's typical type of social comparison was calculated. For the participant's rating 
on each item of the Self-Rated Desirability measure, a negative value, which indicated that the 
participant rated him or herself as being lower than the presenter (upward comparison), was 
assigned a score of -1; a value of 0, which indicated a same-level comparison with the presenter, 
was assigned a score of 0; and a positive value, indicating that the self was rated higher than the 
presenter (downward comparison), was assigned a score of 1. For each participant, the self-
comparison on each of the five desirable attributes on the measure were averaged to serve as 
single index of the overall social comparison made by the participant between him or herself and 
the presenter. These scores were then averaged across all participants belonging to each of the 
four cells in the current study (SADs and HCs in either presenter condition), resulting in a 
continuous variable ranging from  -1 to 1, which served as an index of the average comparison 
elicited by each presenter within each group and condition.       
 In order to better understand the pattern of comparisons within each group and condition,  
the proportion of each type of comparison based on the ratings of the participant’s own 
desirability as compared to the speech presenter were calculated. These were then averaged 
across the five desirable attributes. Participants with HC responded in a consistent way in both 
conditions, generally seeing themselves as more desirable than the speech presenter, with 76% of 
HCs engaging in downward comparisons with the anxious presenter and 71% in downward 
comparisons with the confident presenter. Participants with SAD, however, appeared to be more 
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influenced by the condition and the presenter’s anxiety versus confidence. In the anxious 
presenter condition, the predominant type of comparison was downward even among participants 
with SAD, with 65% of participants engaged in downward comparisons. Conversely, in the 
confident condition, 65% of participants with SAD made upward comparisons with the presenter 
and rated themselves as less desirable than the presenter. Thus, participants in general tended to 
see themselves as superior to the speech presenter except in the case of participants with SAD 
comparing themselves to a confident individual, which resulted predominantly in upward 
comparisons. 
Motivation to engage in social comparisons. With respect to social comparisons in 
general, it was hypothesized that participants with SAD would report more frequently comparing 
themselves to others in general, as assessed by the INCOM questionnaire. This prediction was 
supported. An independent-samples t-test was conducted on total INCOM scores, comparing 
scores for the SAD and HC groups. A significant, albeit somewhat modest difference was found, 
t(80) =2.48, p = .02, with SAD participants reporting significantly higher scores on the INCOM, 
reflecting a greater tendency to engage in social comparisons in their daily lives. 
 Impact of social comparisons on desire for future interaction. It was predicted that 
participants with SAD would see themselves as more inferior to the confident presenter (relative 
to the anxious presenter and to HCs in both conditions) and this upward comparison would lead 
them, in turn, to desire less interaction with him. To evaluate this hypothesis, a mediated 
moderation analysis using the bias-corrected bootstrapping approach was conducted using the 
structural equation modelling software AMOS (version 22.0.0). A mediated moderation model 
was constructed in which the categorical variables of group (SAD and HC), condition (anxious 
and confident presenter), and their interaction (the product of group and condition) were entered 
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as predictors, Self-comparison (the average rating of the self as compared to the speech presenter 
across desirable attributes) was entered as the mediator, and the total score on the DFI 
questionnaire was entered as the outcome variable. This model suggested that the direct effect of 
condition on Self Comparison approached significance (β = .23, p = .09), the direct effect of Self 
Comparison on DFI was significant (β = -.23, p = .04), and the direct effect of condition on DFI 
was significant (β =.43, p =.002). The mediated moderation hypothesis was tested using the bias-
corrected bootstrapping method but was not supported for the test of the indirect path from the 
group by condition interaction term to DFI through Self Comparison, with the confidence 
intervals crossing zero (β = .07, p = .24, 95% CI -.05, .36).  Moreover, the model did not support 
a mediated relationship between group and DFI (β = .03, p = .57, 95% CI -.13, .24).   However, 
Self-comparison approached being a significant mediator of the relationship between condition 
and DFI (β =.05, p = .05, 95% CI 0, .16). 
Given that the hypothesis of a mediated moderation relationship was not supported, in 
order to better understand the relationships between group, condition, self-comparison and DFI, 
two simple mediation models were created (Figures 6 and 7) with group and condition as the 
single predictors, Self-comparison as the mediator, and DFI as the outcome variable. When 
testing the relationship between condition and DFI as mediated by Self Comparison (collapsing 
across group), it was found that the direct effect of condition on Self Comparison was significant 
(β =-.32, p = .003), the direct effect of Partner Type on DFI was significant (β =.36, p <.001), 
and the direct effect of Self Comparison on DFI was at the level of a trend toward a significant (β 
=-.17, p = .10). However, the indirect (i.e., mediated) relationship of condition on DFI 
approached statistical significance (β =.06, p = .08, 95% CI 0, .16). When testing the relationship 
between group and DFI as mediated by Self Comparison (collapsing across condition), it was 
INTERPERSONAL EXPECTANCIES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY  
 
62 
 
found that the direct effect of group on Self Comparison was significant (β =-.39, p < .001), the 
direct effect of group on DFI was not significant (β =-.17, p = .14), and the direct effect of Self 
Comparison on DFI was significant (β =-.35, p = .002). There was also support for the indirect 
(i.e., mediated) relationship of group on DFI (β =.14, p = .002, 95% CI .06, .24).  
To summarize, the findings provided support for the notion that both one’s own level of 
SAD (SAD vs. HC) and the type of presenter he or she considered interacting with (anxious or 
confident) impacted desire for future interaction with the presenter. Further, part of the 
relationship was mediated by differing types of social comparisons between the self and that 
partner. Participants who had SAD (relative to HCs) and those who watched a confident (versus 
anxious) presenter tended to make more favourable (i.e., upward) social comparisons. The more 
positively the social partner was rated relative to the self, the more the participant desired 
interaction with that social partner, while the more inferior the social partner was relative to the 
self, the less the participant wished to have further interaction with the presenter..   
Similarity and desire for future interaction. A pattern of results was hypothesized 
wherein participants with SAD would see themselves as more similar and HC participants would 
see themselves as less similar to the anxious presenter at postmanipulation relative to baseline.  
In the confident presenter condition, the opposite pattern was expected, with HCs seeing 
themselves as more similar to the presenter at postmanipulation as compared to baseline, and 
participants with SAD seeing themselves as less similar to the presenter relative to baseline. To 
test these hypotheses, 2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 (time: baseline, postmanipulation) two-way 
repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted in each condition. In the anxious presenter 
condition, there was no main effect of time, F(1,38) =.45,  p =.51, p =.01, no main effect of 
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group, F(1,38) = .17, p =.68, p < .01, and no group by time interaction, F(1,38) =.71, p =.41, 
p =.02. Thus, the hypothesis related to this condition was not supported. 
In the confident presenter condition, the main effect of time approached significance, 
F(1,39)=3.44, p= .07, p =.08, with participants overall seeing themselves as more similar to 
the confident presenter at postmanipulation relative to baseline. There was also a marginally 
significant main effect of group, F(1,39)=3.39, p =.07, p =.08, with HC participants seeing 
themselves as more similar to the presenter overall, providing partial support for the hypothesis. 
There was no significant group by time interaction, F(1,39) = 1.47, p = .23, p =.04. 
The perceived similarity between the self and the presenter was expected to be positively 
correlated with the desire for future interaction with him was. A bivariate correlation conducted 
across participants (regardless of group and condition) supported this hypothesis (r = .33, p < 
.01). Across group and condition, the more participants saw the presenter as similar to the self 
the greater their desire for future interaction with him. 
With respect to ratings of similarity between the self and the anxious and confident 
presenter, it was predicted that the anxious partner would be rated as more similar to the self by 
participants with SAD and less similar to the self by HC participants. Conversely, it was 
expected that HCs would rate the confident presenter as more similar, and that participants with 
SAD would rate the same presenter as less similar. However, in the anxious partner condition, 
there was no main effect of time, F(1,38) = .45, p = .51, p = .01. There was no main effect of 
group, F(1,38)=.17, p = .68, p <.01. There was also no group by time interaction, F(1,38) =.71, p 
=.41, p =.02. Thus, the visibly anxious presenter did not lead to judgments of less similarity 
relative to baseline, and ratings of similarity did not differ across the two groups. 
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In the confident presenter condition, the main effect of time approached significance, 
F(1,39) =3.44, p =.07, p =.08. The main effect of group also approached significance, F(1,38) 
= 3.39, p =.07, p =.08. There was no significant group by time interaction, F(1,38) =1.47, p 
=.23, p= .04. Thus, participants tended to see the confident presenter as more similar at 
postmanipulation relative to baseline, and HCs tended to see him as more similar to themselves 
overall, but the pattern of change in similarity from baseline to postmanipulation did not differ 
between the two groups. 
Speech performance and self-portrayal concerns. It was predicted that participants 
with SAD who were asked to contemplate giving their own speech after watching a confident 
presenter, as compared to those who watched an anxious presenter, would endorse more concern 
related to revealing self-relevant flaws on the NSPS, and would make more negative predictions 
about their own speech performance as evaluated on the PSP. With respect to self-portrayal 
concerns based on the NSPS, the results of a 2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: anxious 
presenter, confident presenter) two-way between-groups ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
group, F(1, 78) = 132.03,  p <.001, p =.63, with participants with SAD reporting more NSPS 
concerns overall, but no main effect of condition, F(1, 78)= .01, p <.91, p = 0, and no group 
by condition interaction, F(1, 78) = 1.43, p <.24, p =.01. Thus, this hypothesis was not 
supported, and there was no differential impact on self-portrayal concerns as a function of 
watching (and comparing the self with) the confident or anxious speech presenter. 
With respect to PSP scores, changes from pre to postmanipulation in the negative and 
positive subscales of the PSP were examined separately for each of the conditions. Results of the 
2 (time: baseline, postmanipulation) by 2 (group: HC, SAD) two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA examining the positive subscale of the PSP in the anxious presenter condition indicated 
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that there was a main effect of group, F(1,39) =18.9, p <.001,p =.33, with SAD participants 
endorsing fewer positive qualities related to their speeches. However, there was no significant 
main effect of time, F(1,39) = 1.92, p = .17, p =.05, nor a time by group interaction, F(1,39) 
=.95, p =.34, p =.02. In the confident presenter condition, there were main effects of time, 
F(1,39) = 14.56, p <.001, p =.27, with both groups rating the positive aspects of their speech 
lower at postmanipulation as compared to baseline. There was also a main effect of group, 
F(1,39) =14.84, p<.001, p =.28, with participants with SAD endorsing fewer positive 
attributes in their speeches. There was no group by time interaction, F(1,39)= .47, p=.5, p 
=.01.  
With respect to the negative subscale of the PSP in the anxious presenter condition, there 
was a main effect of group, F(1,39) =37.31, p <.001, p =.49, with SAD participants rating 
their own speeches more negatively than HCs. The main effect of time approached significance, 
F(1,39)=3.45, p =.07, p =.08, with negative PSP scores lower at postmanipulation. There was 
no significant group by time interaction, F(1,39) = 2.53, p =.12, p =.06. Similarly, in the 
confident presenter condition, there was a main effect of group, F(1,39) = 49.66, p <.001, p 
=.56, with SAD participants rating their speech more negatively than HCs. The main effect of 
time approached significance, F(1,39) = 3.79, p =.06, p =.09, with negative PSP ratings 
approached  being significantly lower at postmanipulation relative to baseline. There was no 
group by time interaction, F(1,39) = .69, p = .41, p =.02. In summary, while there were 
consistent differences in the speech ratings between the HCs and participants with SAD in the 
expected directions (with SAD participants rating their speeches as having more negative and 
less positive qualities), there was no evidence that watching a confident or anxious speech 
impacted predictions about or perceptions of participants’ own attributes or performance. 
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 Costs of interpersonal blunders. It was expected that SAD and control participants 
would not differ in their evaluations of the cost of imagined blunders for an anxious presenter, 
rating this presenter’s blunders as more interpersonally costly than those of a confident 
individual. Conversely, the groups were expected to differ in their ratings of the costs of blunders 
committed by a confident presenter, with participants with SAD rating the blunders of a 
confident presenter as less costly and the presenter as more able to repair the situation, as 
compared to control participants. A 2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: anxious presenter, 
confident presenter) two-way between-groups ANOVA was conducted to examine this 
hypothesis. This hypothesis was not supported by these results. There was a main effect of 
group, F(1,77) = 10.42, p =.002, p = .12, with participants with SAD rating blunders as more 
costly overall. There was also a main effect of condition, F(1,77) = 15.63, p <.001, p =. 18. 
All participants evaluated the blunders of an anxious presenter as more costly than those of the 
confident presenter. Contrary to predictions, there was no significant group by condition 
interaction F(1,77) = 1.70, p = .19, p = .02. Socially anxious participants were no harsher on 
the anxious presenter, nor any more lenient on the confident presenter than the HC participants 
when it came to estimating the cost of imagined social blunders. 
Desirability of healthy controls relative to participants with SAD. Coders were 
expected to rate participants with SAD in both conditions as less interpersonally desirable than 
HC participants, based on their performances in their video-recorded speeches. A 2 (group: SAD, 
HC) by 2 (condition: anxious, confident) two-way between-groups ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the desirability of participants according to group and condition. There was a main 
effect of group, F(1,80) = 10.33, p =. 002, p = .11. As predicted, HC participants were rated as 
more interpersonally desirable than participants with SAD. There was no main effect of 
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condition, F(1,80) = .32, p =.58, p < .01, and no group by condition interaction, F(1,80) = .60, 
p = .44, p = .01).  
Coded ratings of speech quality. With respect to coder ratings of the quality of the 
speeches produced by HCs relative to participants with SAD, it was predicted that there would 
be a main effect of group, with HC speeches being rated more positively and less negatively. It 
was also expected that a group by condition interaction would emerge, such that participants 
with SAD who compared themselves to a confident speaker would perform more poorly than 
SAD participants who compared themselves with an anxious speaker. Two 2 (group: SAD, HC) 
by 2 (condition: anxious presenter, confident presenter) two-way between-groups ANOVA were 
conducted to examine these hypotheses, using the positive and negative subscales on the PSP 
separately. These hypotheses were partially supported. With respect to negative qualities within 
the speeches, there was a main effect of group, F(1,84) = 16.23, p < .001, p =.16. There was 
no significant main effect of condition, F(1,84) =.64, p =.43, p <.01, or group by condition 
interaction, F(1,84) = .51, p =.48, p <.01. With respect to the positive qualities of the speeches, 
the same pattern of results emerged. There was a main effect of group, F(1,84) = 12.89, p =.001, 
p =.13. There was no main effect of condition, F(1,84) =.09, p =.76, 

p<.01, nor was there an 
interaction between group and condition, F(1,84) =.61, p =.43, p <.01. Coders evaluated the 
speeches of participants with SAD as having more negative and fewer positive qualities as 
evaluated by the PSP, but the condition did not impact ratings. 
The relationship between participant and coder ratings of participant speeches was 
examined across the positive and negative subscales of the PSP separately. In order to calculate 
the discrepancy between self and observer ratings of speeches, standardized residual scores 
reflecting participant ratings of speeches with observer ratings partialled out were calculated 
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(e.g., Gavric, 2014; Rodebaugh & Rapee, 2005; Taylor & Alden, 2011). This was done using a 
regression analysis in which observer ratings were used as a predictor and self-ratings as the 
outcome variable. This was done once for the positive and again for the negative PSP subscale. 
The standardized residual values in each regression were saved as separate variables as an index 
of the amount of variance in self- ratings that could not be accounted for by objective (i.e., 
observer) ratings of speeches, and was considered a useful measure of any existing bias in the 
self-evaluation of participant speech performance. In this case, positive values indicate positive 
bias (i.e., over-endorsement of positive or negative speech characteristics) and negative scores 
indicate negative bias (i.e., under-endorsement of positive or negative speech characteristics).  
2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 (condition: confident presenter, anxious presenter) between-
subjects ANOVA were conducted on these standardized residuals within the negative and 
positive subscales of the PSP separately. With regard to the negative subscale of the PSP, there 
was a significant main effect of group, F(1,76) = 21.28, p <.001, p = .22. There were no 
significant main effects of condition, F(1,76) = .83, p = .37, p = .01, nor any significant group 
by condition interaction, F(1,76) = .37, p = .55, p < .01. Participants with SAD were 
significantly more likely to over-endorse the negative aspects of their speech relative to HCs, 
across both experimental conditions. 
With regard to positive attributes of speeches, a complementary pattern of results 
emerged. A significant main effect of group emerged, F(1,76) = 11.11, p = .001, p = .13. 
There was no significant main effect of condition, F(1,76) = 2.08, p = .153, p = .03, nor a 
significant group by condition interaction, F(1,76) = .09, p = .77, p = .001. Participants with 
SAD showed a tendency to under-endorse the positive attributes of their own speeches relative to 
HCs. 
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Coded ratings of dominance and warmth. It was predicted that participants with SAD 
would be rated as less dominant and less warm in their recorded speeches, as compared to HCs. 
It was also expected that participants with SAD in the confident partner condition would be rated 
as even less dominant and less warm than participants with SAD in the anxious partner condition 
(with a stronger effect on warmth than on dominance). Separate 2 (group: SAD, HC) by 2 
(condition: anxious, confident presenter) two-way between-groups ANOVA were conducted on 
coders’ ratings of participants’ dominance and warmth. Please see Figure 8. 
For dominance, there was a main effect of group, F(1, 84) = 9.81, p =.002, p =  .11. 
There was no main effect of condition, F (1, 84) = .19, p = .67, p < .01, and no group by 
condition interaction, F(1,84) =.24, p = .63, p <.01. Similarly, with regard to warmth, there 
was a main effect of group, F(1, 84) = 5.29, p =.02, p =  .04. There was no main effect of 
condition, F (1, 84) = .02, p = .88, p < .001, and no group by condition interaction, F(1,84) 
=.45, p = .51, p <.01. Participants with SAD were judged as less dominant and less warm 
across both conditions, but neither type of rating was impacted by condition. 
Summary of Results 
To summarize these findings, all participants rated the presenter as less desirable when he 
showed visible anxiety and as more desirable when he displayed social confidence, relative to 
baseline. Similarly, coders rated SAD participants as less desirable than HC participants after 
viewing their recorded speeches. It appears that visible anxiety leads one to be judged by others 
as less socially desirable, while signs of social confidence confer the opposite effect. 
With respect to social comparisons, individuals with SAD reported being more motivated 
to engage in social comparisons in general and tended to evaluate themselves more poorly as 
compared to the speech presenters than HCs. Whereas participants with SAD tended to make 
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upward comparisons with the confident speaker and downward comparisons with the anxious 
presenter, HCs made downward comparisons with both types of presenters. This pattern of 
results closely corresponds to the desirability ratings described above (anxiety leading to lower 
desirability and confidence leading to higher desirability). Thus, signs of anxiety vs. confidence 
may represent important information that leads socially anxious individuals to see the self as 
inferior to confident others, and HCs to view themselves as superior to anxious others. 
Furthermore, separate mediation models found support for the role of social comparisons as 
mediating the relation between both participant group (SAD vs. HC) and condition (anxious vs. 
confident), on one hand, and desire for future interaction, on the other. These findings indicate, 
simply, that evaluating a partner as inferior as compared to the self makes him or her less 
desirable for future interacting.  
With respect to desire for future interaction, both groups reported an increase in their 
desire for future interaction with the confident presenter as compared to baseline, but only HCs 
(and not participants with SAD) reported a drop in their desire for future interaction with the 
anxious presenter. Importantly, all participants viewed an anxious speaker as less likely to desire 
interaction with them (compared to baseline), whereas there was no change relative to baseline in 
participants’ perception of the confident speaker’s desire for future interaction with them. In 
addition, there was a positive relationship (i.e., correlation) between perceived similarity of self 
with partner and the desire to have future interaction with the partner. 
With respect to anxiety, positive affect, and negative affect, participants with SAD 
experienced more anxiety about interaction than HCs regardless of their assigned condition. In 
addition, participants with SAD experienced more negative affect and less positive affect 
throughout the study, and experienced more long lasting, negative changes in affect (e.g., 
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decrease in positive affect and increases in negative affect) after finding out about the demanding 
nature of the study tasks (anticipated speech delivery and social interaction).  
Regarding speech quality, participants with SAD rated their own speeches and self-
portrayal as poorer than HCs. These ratings matched the pattern of speech quality ratings 
provided by coders. However, a direct comparison of self and coder ratings of speeches revealed 
that while both participants with SAD and coders agreed that the speeches produced by 
participants with SAD were poorer than those produced by HCs, individuals with SAD were also 
biased in their ratings of their own speeches, tending to exaggerate the negative attributes and 
under-report the positive attributes of their own speeches. 
With respect to social blunders, participants with SAD rated blunders as being more 
costly in general. In addition, participants across groups rated the blunders of the anxious speaker 
as more costly than those of a confident speaker. Finally, coders blind to diagnostic status rated 
the costs of hypothetical blunders committed by participants with SAD as being higher than 
those of HCs committing the same blunders. 
Finally, participants with SAD were rated by speech coders as being less interpersonally 
warm (i.e., colder) and less interpersonally dominant (i.e., more submissive) than HCs based on 
their recorded speeches. Absolute values indicated that whereas HCs were seen by coders as 
being somewhat warm and dominant, participants with SAD came across, on average, as 
somewhat cold and submissive. 
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Discussion 
 
 The current study was designed to examine the interpersonal appraisals that socially 
anxious and nonanxious individuals make about confident and anxious social partners. Based on 
the extant literature and the earlier study in the present program of research (Bielak & 
Moscovitch, 2013), there is evidence to suggest that individuals with SAD tend to exaggerate 
both the negative social implications of showing visible anxiety (e.g., Purdon et al., 2001) and 
may also exaggerate the positive implications associated with interpersonal confidence (Bielak & 
Moscovitch, 2013). It was predicted that given these evaluative tendencies, individuals with 
SAD engage in numerous unfavourable social comparisons between the socially anxious self and 
confident others, which would result in a heightened sense of social threat, negative interpersonal 
predictions, and less desirable interpersonal behaviour. These predictions are grounded in 
contemporary cognitive, interpersonal, and psychoevolutionary models of SAD. 
It was expected that the results of the present study would replicate and extend the central 
finding of the earlier, vignette-based study (Bielak & Moscovitch, 2013) wherein individuals 
with SAD exhibited a “halo effect” bias to overvalue the positive attributes of a confident 
individual. The current study attempted to improve on the methodology of the earlier study by 
translating the vignette-based task in which they imagined possible social partners into 
laboratory-based one with a real social partner who they were asked to evaluate and with whom 
the participants were led to believe they would interact. In this way, the design of the present 
study allowed for the assessment of interpersonal predictions as they occurred in the anticipation 
of a real rather than imagined social interaction. The design of the current study also provided an 
opportunity to maintain experimental control over the object of comparison by ensuring that all 
participants viewed and responded to the same social stimuli through the use of two pre-
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recorded, pilot-tested videos depicting a single speech presenter delivering the identical speech 
in either a confident or anxious manner. The current study is one of the only studies to date that 
experimentally induced and manipulated social comparisons and examined their consequences 
within the context of social anxiety, and the first to do so in a clinically diagnosed sample of 
participants with SAD (see also Mitchell & Schmidt, 2014). By asking all participants to 
compare themselves to the same individual, the design used in the current study enabled the 
attribution of any group differences to the social comparison tendencies of the participants or the 
manipulated differences in the qualities of the comparison target across conditions.  
Evaluations of Self and Others: Social Comparison Processes 
A central aim of the present study was to examine the role of social comparisons in the 
interpersonal predictions and behaviour of those with SAD. The present study examined the 
process of social comparisons in two ways. First, participants were asked to report on their 
tendency and motivation for social comparisons in general on the INCOM questionnaire. 
Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Antony et al., 2005), it was found that individuals with 
SAD were more motivated to compare themselves frequently to others in their daily lives. Next, 
inspired by the earlier findings related to the differences in evaluations of confident others by 
anxious versus healthy raters, it was hypothesized that the “halo” of desirability that socially 
anxious individuals attribute to confident others would result in more numerous upward 
comparisons with such social partners. To examine this, participant were asked to compare 
themselves with the anxious and confident speech presenter. While there did not appear to be any 
differences between groups in the seemingly universal tendency to evaluate confident others as 
highly desirable, strong support was found for the prediction that individuals with SAD tended to 
make numerous upward social comparisons with new social partners who are confident, whereas 
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HCs typically made downward comparisons, seeing themselves as equally or even more 
desirable than both the anxious and confident presenters. Further, coder ratings that mirrored 
these upward comparisons suggested that these upward comparisons may not be distorted, but 
may in fact reflect real differences in the ways anxious and confident people are perceived by 
others. There has been extensive theory and research evidence supporting the notion that 
downward comparisons have a positive impact while upward comparisons have negative impact 
on mood and self-esteem (e.g., Wood & Lockwood, 1999). In light of this evidence, these 
finding  suggest that individuals with SAD may have a heuristic of evaluating confident others as 
superior to the self across a range of attributes may help explain the heightened sense of social 
threat experienced in social interactions, and the tendencies to submit, self-protect, or withdraw 
in social situations (e.g., Weeks et al., 2009). 
One of the central, and perhaps troubling, findings of the current study is the surprisingly 
high level of concordance between the patterns of self evaluations of individuals with social 
anxiety, who consistently view themselves as inferior and less desirable, with the unfavourable 
ratings elicited amongst participants by the anxious (relative to the confident) presenter, as well 
as the more negative ratings provided by naïve coders of participants with SAD (as compared to 
HCs). It appears that the notion that visible anxiety suggests shortcomings and a lesser social 
status or desirability is a notion that is not unique or distorted in the minds of anxious 
individuals, but a perception that might be shared, to some extent, by all participants across own 
level of anxiety.  As others have also shown (Antony et al., 2005), individuals with SAD in the 
present study perceived themselves as inferior, having less desirability or “social currency” than 
confident individuals with whom they interact, as evidenced by their tendency to compare 
themselves in an upward fashion with the confident speech presenter. It appears that displaying 
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visible signs of anxiety (versus confidence) plays an important role in determining interpersonal 
desirability. Interestingly, in both the current study and earlier work (Bielak & Moscovitch, 
2013), the negative attributions related to visible anxiety were not unique to socially anxious 
individuals. In the 2013 study, both anxious and nonanxious participants experienced a decrease 
in the perceived desirability of a person described as visibly anxious. The same pattern of results 
emerged in the current study with respect to both the interpersonal desirability and desire for 
interaction with the anxious speech presenter. All participants saw the anxious presenter as 
someone they would less like to interact with, while rating the confident presenter as someone 
they would very much like to interact with and as having a higher level of desirability or social 
currency. 
  Further support for this notion emerged from coder ratings of the desirability and desire 
for interaction of participants based on their own speech recordings. Coders watched and rated 
all of the videos produced by study participants, and were blind to the group or condition to 
which each participant belonged and to the nature and hypotheses of the current study. Based 
solely on the recorded speeches, there was a clear group difference wherein coders rated 
participants with SAD as less desirable, and as being less appealing for future interaction. The 
fact these group differences emerged from actual videos produced by individuals with SAD and 
healthy controls suggests that the prior findings in Moscovitch and Bielak (2013) were not 
merely an artefact of the experimental stimuli, but an actual reliable impression related to visible 
anxiety. It is worth noting however, that even though a true difference in the ways individuals 
with visible anxiety and those without were evaluated was found, participants with SAD did also 
show a biased tendency to exaggerate the shortcomings (and underemphasize the positive 
qualities) of their own speeches as compared to the actual objective ratings of these speeches 
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provided by objective raters. It appears that the upward comparisons those individuals with SAD 
engage in when interacting with others who appear confident and their sense of being ranked 
lower within the social hierarchy may not be an entirely distorted view but rather one that has 
been reinforced by less positive reactions from the social world.  
 This combination of exaggerated negative perceptions and bona fide negative evaluations 
by observers has direct implications to interventions for SAD. The emphasis in cognitive-
behavioural interventions for SAD tends to be on identifying and challenging negative, distorted, 
unhelpful thinking patterns and interpersonal predictions. As cognitive-behavioural therapists, 
clinicians appear to be very keen to help clients notice, identify, and challenge distorted 
cognitions related to the probability and cost of negative social outcomes related to appearing 
visibly anxious. Not surprisingly, negative distortions related to the objective performance were 
found in the current study in the form of exaggerated negative and diminished positive self-
ratings of participant speech quality relative to coder ratings. The troubling empirical evidence 
that is emerging from a number of recent studies including our own (e.g., Gee et al., 2012; 
Norton & Hope, 2001) suggests that in addition to these negative self-evaluative biases, the 
negative beliefs, self-appraisals, and predictions made by individuals with SAD also have some 
realistic basis. The social world does appear to judge and potentially even reject individuals who 
appear visibly socially anxious. Thus, the valuable and limited time clinicians spend with clients 
may be most effectively spent in dealing with both the existing distortions, as well as changing 
the unhelpful behaviours that contribute to actual negative evaluations, and/or adaptively dealing 
with and accepting the implications of one’s anxiety. Clients may benefit from having a better 
understanding of what it is about their anxiety or associated behaviours that may be poorly 
received by social partners. It may then be possible to coach clients in ways to counteract the 
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deleterious effects of anxiety on relationship-building (e.g., appearing aloof, disinterested, 
withholding self-disclosure) and more accurately convey their social motivations and level of 
engagement (e.g., increasing warm behaviours and the willingness to share). These ideas are 
consistent with current gold-standard CBT treatments for social anxiety, but with an added 
emphasis on explicitly coaching each client to develop a more socially adaptive repertoire of 
relationship-facilitating interpersonal behaviours. There is preliminary evidence for the notion 
that, while affiliative behaviour may not come as easily or effortlessly to some clients with SAD 
as they do for other individuals, it is possible to effectively train these  if time is set aside within 
therapy to do so (e.g., see Alden & Taylor, 2011).  These ideas are revisited in more detail, 
below. 
Interpersonal Costs of Appearing Anxious 
 This is not the first study to document that socially anxious individuals receive negative 
evaluations from others (e.g., Ashbaugh et al, 2005; Bielak & Moscovitch, 2013, Creed & 
Funder, 1998; Gee et al, 2012; Voncken & Dijk, 2013). The data from the current study, 
however, provide important additional information regarding the mechanisms underlying these 
apparent interpersonal rejections. First, support was found for notion that social comparisons 
mediate the relationship between social anxiety and desire for future interaction. Across all of 
our participants, the higher the ratings of the self as compared to the presenter, the lower the 
participant’s desire for interaction with the presenter. Conversely, the lower the ratings of the self 
as compared to the presenter, the higher the desire for future interaction. Participants clearly wish 
to interact with those who are perceived as being equal or better than the self. Considering this 
finding in addition to the findings that confident individuals are seen as highly desirable and 
anxious individuals as less desirable, our data seem to suggest that the upward social 
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comparisons in which individuals with SAD engage when encountering confident others are not 
necessarily exaggerated or biased, but may reflect a real tendency for the social world to respond 
unfavourably, or even reject, to those displaying visible anxiety. While research has shown that 
individuals with SAD overestimate how visible their anxiety is to other people (e.g., Brown & 
Stopa, 2007), it is noteworthy that our coders, who were blind to participant condition, did rate 
our SAD participants as having performed more poorly and as less warm and desirable for future 
interaction, relative to our HCs, suggesting that there were clear, observable differences in the 
ways the groups performed and the impressions they made on the audience. Thus, our data 
suggest a sobering and somewhat surprising concordance between the perception of individuals 
with SAD that they are inferior and less desirable than confidence others, and the less-than-
optimal interpersonal evaluations of them that are made by their social partners and observers. It 
is noteworthy (though perhaps not entirely surprising), that participants with SAD also tended to 
exaggerate the negative (and minimize the positive) attributes of their own performance when 
they reflected on their own speeches, relative to objective ratings of the same speeches. In sum, 
while individuals with SAD appear to truly perform more poorly than HCs on social (e.g., 
speech) tasks and elicit more negative responses from the audience, their impression of just how 
poorly they performed appeared to be exaggerated relative to their objective performance. 
  Given the evidence that the negative beliefs held by participants with SAD regarding 
their own performances were at least somewhat consistent with objective ratings (even if 
exaggerated), it is worthwhile to examine potential reasons for the negative social reactions these 
participants elicited. One potential explanation for the negative social responses elicited by the 
anxious presenter in our study participants -- and, in parallel, by the SAD participants in coders’ 
ratings -- may pertain to perceived similarity. Previous research has shown that nonanxious 
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people rate individuals with SAD as less similar to themselves, and this contributes, at least in 
part, to the interpersonal rejection of these individuals (e.g., Voncken, Bögels, & Roelofs, 2008). 
However, in our study, all participants, regardless of their own anxiety level, did not rate the 
visibly anxious presenter as less similar to the self than they rated the confident presenter. Thus, 
it is unlikely that a sense of dissimilarity would account for the lower ratings of desirability or 
diminished desire to interact with the anxious presenter. It is noteworthy, however, that while 
similarity did not appear to be a factor in the interpersonal rejection of the anxious partner, 
participants did tend to rate the confident presenter as more similar to themselves after watching 
his video relative to baseline ratings of similarity, and there was a positive relationship between 
similarity and desire for future interaction. Thus, in our study there appeared to be other factors 
leading to rejection (e.g., the perception that the anxious presenter was disinterested and his 
colder and more submissive interpersonal stance, as discussed in more detail below). On the 
other hand, it is important to note that while the anxious presenter did not elicit decreased ratings 
in perceived similarity among participants in either group, the confident partner’s speech elicited 
robust increases in such ratings, with a trend for HCs relative to participants with SAD to rate the 
confident partner as more similar to themselves. There is ample evidence that mere exposure and 
familiarity to another person tends to increase both liking and ratings of similarity (e.g., 
Moreland & Zajonc, 1982). The increased similarity ratings obtained after participants watched 
the confident speech might reflect this natural tendency to identify with people one gest to know 
and notice ways in which one is similar to others as more information becomes available about 
them. It is thus perhaps surprising and informative that after watching the anxious presenter’s 
speech, ratings of similarity did not reflect the expected increases in similarity and liking as they 
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did in the confident partner condition (e.g., see also Rodebaugh, Bielak, Vidovic, & Moscovitch, 
2015). 
Warmth, Dominance, and Impression Formation 
A key piece of relevant information comes out of the ratings provided by participants of 
their perceptions of the anxious and confident speakers’ desire to interact with them. Both groups 
of participants rated the anxious presenter as appearing less interested in interacting with them. 
To begin to unpack what it is about the interpersonal stance of socially anxious individuals (as 
compared to nonanxious individuals) that communicates a general sense of disinterest in 
interaction, video coders were asked to code the dominance and warmth of all of our participant 
videos. As reviewed above in the Introduction, the two orthogonal attributes of warmth (or 
affiliation) and dominance are central to the interpersonal circumplex model of personality 
(Leary, 1957).  The results of the current study indicated that anxious participants came across, 
on average, as less dominant (or more submissive) and less warm (or colder) than HCs.  
The notion that many (but not all) socially anxious individuals appear cold has been 
documented in other studies (Cain, Pincus, & Holforth, 2010). It has been widely established in 
the interpersonal literature that behaviours conveying warmth are conducive to relationship 
initiation and maintenance. One way to understand the impact of warmth (vs. coldness) is to 
consider the interpersonal dimensions of warmth and dominance as a 45-degree rotation of 
extraversion and agreeableness, two attributes in the Big Five model of Personality that have 
particular relevance for interpersonal processes (e.g., Markey and Markey, 2009). It has been 
demonstrated that high extraversion is characterized by warm dominance, and high 
agreeableness is characterized by warm submissiveness. These qualities have been shown to be 
critically important to positive interpersonal relationships, with extraversion primarily relating to 
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impression formation (Borkenau, Brecke, Mötig, & Paelecke, 2009) and agreeableness to longer-
term liking, maintaining relationships, and relationship satisfaction (Wortman & Wood, 2011). 
Thus, the interpersonal style of individuals with social anxiety – lower on extraversion and 
somewhat lower on agreeableness (see for a review, see Levinson, Kaplan, & Rodebaugh, 2012) 
– may convey a message of disinterest in interaction. It may also convey a lack of the 
interpersonally valued qualities of agreeableness and extraversion, potentially signalling to social 
partners that the person might be challenging to interact with or get to know. 
Another way to understand the important finding that nonanxious individuals come 
across as warm, while socially anxious participants are judged as being cold, is through the 
perspective of interpersonal complementarity (e.g., Carson, 1969; Sadler, Ethier, & Woody, 
2011). This perspective suggests that people are drawn to, and have most productive and 
enjoyable interactions with, others who are like them on the affiliation dimension and dissimilar 
to them on the dominance dimension.  Warm individuals are likely to seek out complementary 
others who are warm themselves (e.g., Rodebaugh, Bielak, Vidovic, & Moscovitch, 2015). 
Warm individuals thus have the advantage of being seen as complementary to other warm 
people, whereas cold individuals such as those with SAD are likely to be perceived as 
acomplementary by individuals who are themselves, not anxious and tend to be warm. In 
addition to being acomplementary, a colder, less friendly interpersonal stance is seen as 
involving less adaptive behaviours that foster interpersonal closeness such as self-disclosure 
(Alden & Taylor, 2011). In this way, individuals with SAD may be stuck in negative 
interpersonal transaction styles (Kiesler, 1996) where their own cold behavior elicits similarly 
cold reactions and behaviour from others, as appears to be the case in the current study.  
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It is noteworthy that while our participants with SAD were also rated as being less 
dominant in addition to being less warm than HCs, writers within the interpersonal literature 
have not identified submissiveness as being as consistently and globally problematic for social 
interactions and impression formation as reduced warmth. Instead, such writers emphasize that 
the best interpersonal outcomes result from a higher degree of complimentarity (or oppositeness) 
between partners in a given social interaction (e.g., Sadler, Ethier, Gunn, Duong, & Woody, 
2009). Thus, while submissive behaviour may be more and less problematic across different 
interactions, the lack of warmth observed by our coders appears to be an attribute more 
consistently associated with interpersonal dysfunction, and will thus be the focus of our 
discussion related to the empirical and clinical implications of our findings for SAD. 
A crucial distinction between interpersonal coldness or unfriendliness in general and the 
lack of warmth conveyed by socially anxious individuals is that individuals with SAD may 
appear cold, unfriendly or disinterested due to elevated anxiety, safety behaviour use, or a lack 
of interpersonal competence. In reality, however, these individuals typically have a strong desire 
for interpersonal connection with others (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995).  There has been 
considerable debate regarding whether the problematic interpersonal behaviours of SAD 
participants is better conceptualized as a skills deficit, a product of elevated anxiety and self-
protection, or a stable personality style (e.g., Baker & Edelmann, 2002; Hofmann, 2007; Stopa & 
Clark, 1993; Thompson & Rapee, 2002; Voncken, Alden, & Bögels, 2006; Voncken, Alden, 
Bögels, & Roelofs, 2008, Voncken, Dijk, de Jong, & Roelofs, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; 
see a review of this literature by Angelico, Jose, Crippa, & Lourreiro, 2013). The majority of 
studies examining social skills deficits in SAD have found that individuals with social anxiety 
(across both clinical and analogue samples) come across as less socially competent as compared 
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to nonanxious individuals (e.g., Alden & Wallace, 1995; Norton & Hope, 2001; see review by 
Angelico et al., 2013). This robust finding is not surprising, yet the immense challenge in 
understanding this finding is in disentangling true deficits  (i.e., a lack of certain interpersonal 
knowledge or the absence specific social skills) from the inability to access or utilize certain 
interpersonal knowledge or skills due to the physiological and cognitive consequences of anxiety 
(Barlow, 2002; Hofmann, 2007). From the extant literature, it appears likely that a combination 
of bona-fide deficits (including a lack of practice with a subset of social behaviours), as well as 
the cognitive, behavioural, and physiological manifestations of anxiety might, in varying 
combinations for each individual client, might be to blame. Regardless of whether the social 
deficits arise from one factor or the other (or a combination thereof), one consistent finding 
(including ours) is that the interpersonal behaviour of individuals with SAD is clearly leading to 
less positive engagement and a less affiliative response from others. As such, it seems clear that 
interpersonal competence is worth directly targeting in treatment.  
As reviewed in the Introduction, a growing literature describes safety behaviour use in 
SAD and its consequences, which have typically been shown to be unhelpful and even 
counterproductive. Thus, contemporary cognitive-behavioural treatments of SAD (e.g. Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Hope, Heimberg, & Turk, 2006; McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014; Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997) emphasize targeting and reducing safety behaviours. Some common safety behaviours 
observed in SAD include avoiding eye contact, limiting self-disclosure, being overly agreeable, 
hiding or masking certain physical flaws (e.g., makeup to hide blushing or blemishes), 
excessively rehearsing prior to social situations, and many others. The rationale for targeting 
such safety behaviours, as it is conveyed to socially anxious clients, is that safety behaviours 
maintain an exaggerated sense of social danger in the situation, eliminating the opportunity for 
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clients to learn that without safety behaviours, their threatening predictions do not come true. 
That said, participants and coders alike in the present study indicated perceiving anxious 
individuals as less likable or appealing as interaction partners and as having less desirable 
attributes.  These findings suggest that the perception of social threat (e.g., anticipating criticism 
or rejection) may not be entirely exaggerated and raises the question of whether there may be 
some utility to safety behaviours that function to conceal visible symptoms of anxiety. On the 
other hand, interventions involving the elimination of safety behaviours have been shown to have 
positive impact on both self-reported and partner-reported measures of social interactions (e.g., 
Taylor & Alden, 2010; Taylor & Alden, 2011). The key to reconciling these two sets of findings 
may lie in a more fine-grained analysis of safety behaviours, such as the one recently published 
by Plasencia, Alden, and Taylor (2011). These authors provided support for two distinct 
substypes of safety behaviours: avoidance and impression management. Like in previous studies 
(Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004), they found that avoidance safety behaviours (e.g., low self-
disclosure, reduced eye contact) were associated with more negative responses from others, 
while impression-management behaviours (e.g., rehearsal, feigning friendliness) were not. The 
authors reasoned that these impression management strategies may appear similar enough to the 
prosocial behaviour of nonanxious individuals, and may help fend off interpersonal rejection, at 
least in the short term. Given the established importance of extraversion in early impression 
formation, and our findings related to the impact of anxiety on partner perceptions of socially 
anxious individuals’ desire for continued interaction, it makes sense that socially anxious 
individuals who deliberately choose to engage in friendly behaviours (even if not completely 
genuinely) in order to gain positive responses from others may succeed in doing so. In some 
ways, individuals with SAD seem to be locked in a lose-lose predicament: if they appear anxious 
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or convey interpersonal coldness and submissiveness, they elicit negative responses from others. 
If they attempt to hide their anxiety or engage in impression management (also termed 
“innocuous sociability”), they end up feeling inauthentic, and their partners may pick up on this 
lack of genuineness and view their behaviour as being less natural and, therefore, less likable. 
Are there any circumstances under which socially anxious individuals may engage in a new set 
of more warm, more extraverted behaviours, while maintaining a sense of authenticity and 
gaining social acceptance? The results of Plasencia, Alden, and Taylor (2011) seem to suggest 
that the type of safety behaviour patients choose to use (avoidance vs. impression management) 
greatly impacts the outcome, as does whether the socially anxious individual perceives these 
new, unfamiliar ways of acting as inauthentic behaviours they must adopt in order to garner the 
liking of others, or as experimentation with new ways of being more friendly and open with 
others which allow others to get to know their authentic selves. It could be expected that these 
new, less practiced social behaviours may seem somewhat foreign or even fake to individuals 
with SAD initially. Therapists can guide the process by normalizing and providing feedback and 
encouragement, as well as reframing these behaviours not as a pretense or “act” necessary to 
gain the liking of others, but as a way of practice a set of useful, potentially forgotten or rusty 
interpersonal skills; guided by this therapeutic stance, the socially anxious client may gradually 
begin to integrate these behaviours into his or her interpersonal identity and behavioural 
repertoire. This reframe, the frank and encouraging support, and judicious use  of gentle 
feedback, could enable the therapist (and other clients, if in a group setting), to help clients 
persist in the challenging early period of experimenting with less familiar, “safe”, or comfortable 
interpersonal behaviours.  
Treatment Implications: Training Skills and Interpersonal Approach Behaviours 
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Given that the interpersonal stance of individuals with SAD leads to less engagement and 
friendliness from others, and given that their own coping efforts (i.e., safety behaviours) are 
generally unhelpful, it is pertinent to consider the notion that treatment for social anxiety should 
include guidance and training of specific behaviours that are aimed at gaining more positive 
responses from social partners. Current gold-standard CBT treatments for SAD approach this 
issue somewhat indirectly. The focus tends to be on challenging negative predictions individuals 
hold related to the ways they come across and others will respond to them, and eliminating 
avoidance and safety behaviours which are seen as barriers to both new learning and genuine 
social connection. In light of our findings and those of others (e.g., Gee et al., 2012; Norton & 
Hope, 2001) there may be a “kernel of truth” in these negative cognitions, in that others do 
respond more poorly to individuals with SAD and see them as less desirable partners for future 
interaction. It is noteworthy that this negative evaluation or rejection may be quite subtle, 
nuanced, and gradual, making it elusive to identify clearly in client accounts of social events or 
on behavioural experiment records, which are some of the most widely-used and effective CBT 
tools in our clinical repertoire. For an illustrative example, consider a client with SAD who 
might report in CBT treatment the distorted prediction that a classmate would ridicule or outright 
ignore him if he attempted to begin a conversation with him. With the therapist’s guidance, the 
client may endeavour to test his predictions, and discover much to his relief, that the predicted 
social rejection did not take place – the classmate politely reciprocated in a short conversation 
and even seemed reasonable engaged. However, what the client and therapist may not realize is 
that the client may, at the same time, have come across as somewhat aloof and unapproachable to 
the classmate during the conversation, and thus be passed over for an invitation for an outing 
with other classmates some time later. 
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As can be seen from this example, while there is certainly ample evidence to support the 
importance of the central task of challenging negative cognitions during CBT for SAD, the 
extant literature seems also to support the need to help clients better navigate social situations in 
order to succeed at the more distal outcome of connecting with others in positive ways and 
having others want to spend more time with them. In current CBT treatments, the primary 
strategy to achieve this end is through exposure in combination with the elimination of safety 
behaviours. As discussed in the Introduction, safety behaviours have been shown to contaminate 
social encounters and lead individuals to come across as more distracted, cold, or less genuine. 
The assumption in eliminating these behaviours is that if safety behaviours are reduced, other, 
more genuine, warm, socially desirable behaviours will emerge (e.g., eye contact, demonstrating 
interest in the other person and in the interaction, smiling, appropriate self-disclosure). For a 
considerable number of clients, these behaviours may be completely out of practice, or may have 
never been practiced or refined due to many years of social avoidance. The therapist (and other 
clients, if in a group) could be instrumental in providing a forum for safely experimenting and 
practicing ways of responding in pro-social ways, as well as offering invaluable genuine 
feedback on the ways subtle elements of an individual client’s social stance impacts those around 
him or her. While these exercises are not absent from commonly used SAD treatment protocols, 
the emerging evidence suggests clients may need even more support in this domain, and that it 
cannot necessarily be assumed that such behaviours will spontaneously emerge when clients are 
instructed to drop safety behaviours. In other words, there are two sides to the equation– 
dropping safety behaviours and filling the vacuum with adaptive prosocial behaviours that are 
designed to foster social connection – and both require therapeutic emphasis. 
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The notion that individuals with SAD may benefit from training specifically aimed at 
improving interpersonal skills is not a novel one. To this end, considerable research has 
examined the impact of augmenting cognitive-behavioural therapy for SAD with social skills 
training. The exact structure, content, and length of social skills training has varied from study to 
study, but it typically involves psychoeducation, therapist modeling, and structured exercises to 
practice one or several specific social skills, including (among others): initiating, maintaining, 
and finishing a conversation, giving and receiving feedback, making and refusing requests, 
expressing opinions, etc. (e.g., see Antony and Swinson 2008). Although social skills training 
may not directly target the general interpersonal stance of clients (e.g., making them appear 
friendlier), it is possible that training clients on how to cope with specific interpersonal situations 
in a more pro-social, friendly manner might improve interpersonal outcomes.  
Studies on the effectiveness of integrating social skills training into existing CBT have 
yielded mixed findings. Several studies found that adding this component, while not reducing the 
effectiveness of standard CBT, led to outcomes that were no better than those of standard CBT 
for SAD (Mersch, 1994; Bögels and Voncken, 2008). Other studies, however, found that it did 
enhance the benefits or longevity of the impact of standard CBT (e.g., Argyle, Bryant, & Trower, 
1974; Beidel et al., 2014; Herbert, Gaudiano, Rheingold, Myers, Dalrymple, & Nolan, 2005; van 
Dam-Baggen & Kraaimaat, 2000; also see review by Huppert, Roth, & Foa, 2003).   
One recent study by Alden and Taylor (2011) attempted to directly modify the 
interpersonal stance of individuals with SAD. They applied interpersonal theory and the notion 
of complementarity (described above) to train clients to adopt a friendlier, warmer, more pro-
social interpersonal stance when engaging with others. They used a modified treatment approach 
they called “Interpersonal CBT”, which incorporated many of the elements of traditional CBT 
INTERPERSONAL EXPECTANCIES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY  
 
89 
 
for social anxiety (e.g., examination and testing of beliefs, identification of safety behaviours). 
Their approach differed, however, from traditional CBT by introducing elements of Interpersonal 
Psychotherapy, which included identifying each client’s recurrent interpersonal patterns and their 
impact on partners and interactions (both within the treatment group and in their daily lives), and 
helping clients test out different ways of interacting with others.  
One of the stated aims of this treatment was to increase social approach behaviours of 
individuals with SAD, which are thought to be essential to relationship formation. The authors 
found that these relational treatment strategies were readily implemented by their clients with 
SAD. Clearly, clients saw the interpersonal approach strategies as potentially helpful and felt that 
they were able to put them into practice successfully. The authors found that the interpersonally 
focused CBT had comparable impact to a standard CBT protocol in reducing social fear and 
avoidance symptoms, and such benefits were maintained for the 6-month follow-up period. 
Interestingly, this treatment approach was also associated with increases in both social approach 
and relationship satisfaction. The latter finding is particularly encouraging as it suggests that a 
relationally-focused intervention for SAD was able to create impact that went beyond symptom 
reduction. In successfully addressing these central interpersonal difficulties of individuals with 
SAD in a consistent and sustainable way, Alden and Taylor (2011) provided a potential novel 
roadmap for improving the interpersonal functioning of individuals with SAD. 
Study Limitations  
The results of the present study should be considered in light of the study’s limitations. It 
is important to note, in this respect, that the results of our present study did not fully support our 
main predictions, which were based on our earlier online study (Bielak & Moscovitch, 2013). To 
review, the main findings from our earlier study were suggestive of a bias in evaluations of 
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confident partners by individuals with high levels of social anxiety (using an analogue sample). 
Our current findings, instead, indicated that all participants, including both individuals with SAD 
and HCs, tended to evaluate confident individuals positively and anxious individuals negatively, 
and supported the notion that socially anxious presentations are judged as being less socially 
desirable. While our findings did not support our main, they are consistent with a number of 
other studies. However, it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in the patterns of 
results between this study and our previous study without conducting additional research. To this 
end, one limitation of the present study was that the current study examined a single clinical 
group in comparison to a healthy control group, thus making it impossible to determine to what 
extent our findings might apply specifically to SAD or more generally to any anxiety-related or 
mood-related disorder.  Future studies on this topic could recruit clinical samples of individuals 
with SAD, and compare them to both samples of individuals with other anxiety disorders (to 
determine whether any effects are specific to SAD or general among clinically anxious 
individuals), as well as healthy controls.  
A second limitation of this study arose from the necessity of deceiving participants about 
the true purpose of the study, and making them believe that another participant was completing 
the study at the same time they were. Participant suspicion was assessed using the funnel 
debriefing technique and excluded those participants who endorsed a high level of suspicion that 
the study purpose and structure (e.g., presence of another participant) was not as was initially 
stated. It is possible, however, that non-excluded participants still experienced mild levels of 
suspicion which impacted their responses to various measures over the course of the study. 
Third, the issue of gender as a moderating factor in interpersonal expressions of social 
anxiety has been highlighted as important in other studies (e.g., Mitchell & Schmidt, 2013), but 
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was not possible to examine empirically in the current one. A number of more specific 
interesting, potentially important questions related to the role of gender and gender match (same 
vs. opposite gender interactions) remain to be explored. However, given the low number of male 
relative to female participants in the current study, it was not possible to statistically study 
gender as a moderator. It was also decided to use the same male presenter across all participants 
to limit any differences between speech presenter and speeches that would impact social 
comparisons. These choices limited our ability to examine the influence of gender on any of our 
key findings, an issue that certainly merits further research attention in future studies.   
Fourth, the confident presenter was rated during pilot-testing as appearing more 
“Natural/Realistic” in the video than the anxious presenter.  Ideally, both videos would have 
been rated as being equally realistic. However, given that the vast majority of study participants 
believed the cover story for the study and believed that the speech presenter was, indeed, another 
participant, it appears that for most participants, the anxious video may have been sufficiently 
convincing. Moreover, it is possible that some of the pilot raters based their ratings of 
“natural/realistic” on the criterion of behaving in a natural rather than believable manner. This 
distinction is important, as the anxious presenter’s behaviours may have appeared somewhat less 
“natural” (i.e., more stilted) than those of the confident presenter’s, but perhaps not less 
believable per se. Nonetheless, using a pre-recorded speech and an actor to portray a socially 
anxious individual was certainly a limitation of the present study. 
Fifth, the demographic characteristics of our samples of individuals with SAD and HCs 
raise some potential limitations in terms of both the validity and the generalizability of our 
findings. Because our participants with SAD were significantly older than our HCs (means of 
29.0 years for our participants with SAD, and 23.7 for our HCs) it is impossible to categorically 
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rule out the possibility that slightly older age may have impacted some of our findings of 
interest.  In addition, the fact that many of our participants were generally young adults in their 
20s or early 30s may limit the generalizability of our findings to older (or younger) individuals 
with SAD. Also, the vast majority of our participants in both groups were either Caucasian or 
Asian in descent. This is reflective of the racial/ethnic composition of the Kitchener-Waterloo 
community, but may limit the generalizability of our findings to individuals from other groups 
and backgrounds.  
Finally, a related shortcoming of the study is the use of a speech rather than interaction 
task to make inferences about the impact of social anxiety on social skills and interpersonal 
impression-making. The use of a speech task allowed us to maintain stronger experimental 
control on the object of social comparison, ensuring that all participants were comparing 
themselves to the same two speech presenters based on comparable information. Maintaining 
such control would be very difficult in a dynamic interaction task, where one person’s behaviour 
has an immediate impact on others. The threat of an upcoming interaction was used to elicit 
predictions about interacting with anxious and confident partners. Ideally, though, social 
comparisons and their influence would be best studied in the context in which they typically 
occur, namely in the course of meeting and interacting with individuals in daily life within their 
natural environments.    
Conclusion and Future Directions 
 Limitations notwithstanding, these findings extend the current understanding of SAD in a 
number of important ways. Like several earlier studies, the current study provides strong 
evidence that visible displays of social anxiety could be interpersonally costly. Social partners 
across the anxiety spectrum appear to evaluate the display of visible anxiety and/or associated 
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interpersonal behaviours as indicators of lower overall desirability and greater interpersonal 
coldness and submissiveness, and socially anxious individuals are judged overall as being less 
appealing interaction partners. Socially anxious individuals seem to be acutely aware of their 
relatively low social status, engaging in frequent, unfavourable (i.e., upward) social comparisons 
with confident others. The present study and others (e.g., Weeks, 2009) suggest that these 
comparisons only reinforce the perception of social threat, and motivate continued submissive 
and avoidant social behaviours.  
These findings have important implications for current cognitive behavioural 
interventions for social anxiety. Current CBT treatments SAD rely on two important 
assumptions, which are potentially clarified or challenged by this set of findings. First, CBT 
strategies imply that the social threat perceived by individuals with SAD and appraisals of the 
probability and cost of negative reactions from others (e.g., rejection or humiliation) are grossly 
exaggerated. These findings directly challenge this assumption, and provide strong evidence that 
the colder, more submissive interpersonal stance of individuals with SAD during social 
encounters leads to actual negative evaluations and higher rates of interpersonal rejection. As 
described in the example provided earlier, this rejection may not take the overt, hostile form that 
individuals with SAD predict that it would take (e.g., another person being overtly rude or 
unfriendly to them). It may, instead, simply lead social partners to opt to interact with warmer, 
nonanxious others and exclude or distance themselves from the individual with SAD, leading to 
missed social opportunities and propagating social isolation. While the case-by-case rejection 
may be quite subtle, if these missed opportunities should become a recurrent theme in an 
individual’s social world, they may nonetheless make it more difficult for individuals with SAD 
to form satisfying, lasting connections with others.  
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The second assumption underlying current treatments for SAD emphasizes the central 
role of safety behaviour reduction. Safety behaviours are seen as a primary obstacle to social 
success for individuals with SAD, with the underlying wisdom suggesting that as the individual 
becomes less preoccupied with concealing aspects of the self, more favourable, genuine, and 
desirable interpersonal behaviours should naturally emerge. The current study’s methods did not 
address the second assumption directly, yet clinical experience in the treatment of social anxiety 
would suggest that in reality, this process unfolds very differently across clients. Some clients 
naturally thrive in current CBT treatments for SAD. As they begin to avoid less and challenge 
their negative cognitions, they begin to display warmer, more desirable interpersonal behaviours, 
and social partners respond very positively to their efforts, rewarding them with more interest, 
social opportunities, and the sense of connectedness they have longed for. However, a substantial 
proportion of clients, despite experiencing reduced avoidance and social fear, struggle to 
translate their reduction in fear and avoidance to increased social approach behaviours, and 
ultimately, into increased quantity and quality of meaningful interpersonal relationships. One 
possibility, and one that is indirectly supported by our findings,  is that, even when these 
individuals engage more in the social world, they nevertheless struggle to make the behavioural 
changes (e.g., appearing interested and engaged, displaying warm, sharing with others) that 
communicate to others that they are both interested in and worth getting to know. Our findings 
suggest that clinical interventions (and clinicians’ ability to help both the former and latter 
groups of clients) may be enhanced by the addition of interpersonal strategies and explicit 
training of interpersonal awareness and behaviours that communicate warmth, interest, and 
engagement (e.g., appropriate nodding, smiling, eye contact, self-disclosure). Clinicians need to 
be mindful that these behaviours may to be quite outside the normal interpersonal repertoire of 
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individuals with SAD. The recent results of Alden and Taylor (2011), as well as others (e.g., 
Beidel et al., 2014) who have integrated a focus on interpersonal processes and social skills 
training, suggest that with skilled therapist guidance, clients are readily able to integrate more 
approach behaviours into their interpersonal repertoire 
An even more unorthodox and dramatic interpretation of the relative importance of 
focusing on interpersonal dynamics (as opposed to specific CBT interventions) in the treatment 
of SAD comes from a recent study by Bjornsson et al (2011).  Bjornsson et al. (2011) compared 
the effectiveness of a standard CBT group therapy for SAD with a psychotherapy group which 
was structurally equivalent, but which stripped away all the typical “content”, and focused 
entirely on group dynamics. The authors found that the two interventions were no different in 
their effectiveness for the treatment of SAD. Bjornsson et al. (2011)’s findings do not negate the 
value of the cognitive and behavioural interventions for SAD, but underscore an argument that 
has received substantial attention in interpersonal theories but has continued to be somewhat 
underutilized in group-based CBT: being in the presence of other people and allowing one 
another’s current behaviours, feelings, and reactions in the “here and now” to become the topic 
of discussion, rather than mere background to the discussion of “agenda topics”, can provide 
socially anxious clients with tremendous, timely insight into the ways they impact others, and 
can therefore effect tremendous change in both thought and behaviour (see Yalom & Leszcz, 
1987). Bjornsson et al.(2011)’s surprising findings suggest that perhaps the future of CBT for 
SAD lies in paring down some of the cognitive-behavioural “content” of current content-heavy 
CBT interventions in order to free up some therapeutic time and space for a more unstructured, 
equally important focus on therapeutic and interpersonal “process”. Doing this may allow clients 
to gain important and rare insight into the ways their behaviour impacts other individuals in their 
INTERPERSONAL EXPECTANCIES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY  
 
96 
 
presence and shape their interpersonal experiences, and how they can become more skilful, 
intentional, and genuine in the interpersonal messages they send. Such insight and practice, it 
appears, can be crucial in order to help clients (especially those for whom this process of 
interpersonal mastery not occur naturally) achieve their ultimate goal of gaining interpersonal 
connectedness and satisfaction. 
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Footnote 
 
 1
 It was not predicted for there to be a significant relationship between age and any of the 
central outcomes in the current study. In order to determine whether this is the case, a 
preliminary exploration of any such relationship was examined by calculating Pearson 
correlations between age and the outcomes of interest in the current study, including: Desirability 
Index, DFI, similarity, blunders composite, and PSP. None of the correlations were statistically 
significant (r’s < .19, p’s > .09).  
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Table 1. Pilot data for confident and anxious video stimuli (range for each item is 1 to 5) 
Domain of Ratings Anxious 
Video 
 
Confident Video t (10) p 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Intelligent 3.64 (.81) 3.91(.70) 1.40 .19 
Calm 2.00 (.77) 3.91 (.54) 6.71 .00* 
Warm 1.64 (.50) 3.27 (.9) 6.71 .00* 
Nervous 4.00 (1.34) 1.91(1.14) 4.58 .00* 
Likeable 2.64 (.67) 3.64 (.81) 3.03 .01* 
Realistic/Natural 2.45 (1.13) 4.18 (.40) 5.19 .00* 
Anxious 4.00 (1.18) 1.45 (.52) 7.48 .00* 
Friendly 2.09 (.94) 4.00 (.63) 9.04 .00* 
Confident 1.36 (.50) 3.91 (.70) 10.29 .00* 
Competent 3.27 (.70) 3.91 (.90) 2.06 .16 
Happy 1.91 (.94) 3.55 (.69) 6.71 .00* 
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Table 2. Demographic and Clinical Characteristics for Participants with SAD and HCs within 
each experimental condition 
Variable Social Anxiety 
Disorder 
(Anxious 
Presenter 
Condition;      
n = 20) 
Healthy 
Controls 
(Anxious 
Presenter 
Condition 
n=21) 
Social Anxiety 
Disorder 
(Confident  
Presenter 
Condition 
n=20) 
Healthy Controls 
(Confident Presenter 
Condition n=21) 
Gender (% female) 75.0 61.9 70.0 61.9 
Age – M (SD) 28.00 
(12.47) 
24.29 (10.32) 30.00 (9.90) 23.10 (7.58) 
Ethnicity (%)  
  Caucasian 
  Asian 
  Black 
  Latino 
  Other 
 
52.4 
42.8 
4.8 
0 
0 
 
50.0 
30.0 
10.0 
5.0 
0 
 
61.9 
38.1 
0 
0 
0 
 
65.0 
20.0 
10.0 
0 
5.0 
Clinical Severity of 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
(8-point scale) M (SD) 
5.2 (.77) - 5.45 (.69) - 
% with additional 
diagnoses  
Pure SAD 
 
 
Co-Principal 
 
Additional  
 
 
40 
 
30 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
55 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
Co-Principal Diagnoses 
(%) 
Depression 
Other Anxiety Disorder 
  
 
10 
10 
  
 
 35 
10 
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Other Disorders 
None 
10 
70 
10 
45 
Additional Diagnoses 
(%) 
  Depression                                   
  Other Anxiety       
  Other Disorders 
  None 
 
 
25 
15 
15 
45 
 
  
 
0 
45 
10 
45 
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Table 3. Interrater reliability of video coding data 
Variable ICC (Consistency) 
Desirability Index 
DFI 
.85 
.76  
PSP Positive 
PSP Negative 
.89 
.83 
Blunders Composite 
Warmth 
Dominance 
Similarity to Self 
.73 
.74 
.81 
 .48 
Note: Variables with ICC values of less than .6 (italicized) were not averaged across coders and 
were not used in further analyses 
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Table 4. Normality Indices for Descriptive and Independent Measures within the SAD and HC 
Participant Groups 
 
Variable N Skew SEskew Kurtosis SEkurtosis K-S P 
PANAS Positive 
(baseline) 
SA 40 .97 .37 .73 .73 .167 <.01 
HC 42 .32 .37 -.31 .72 .17 <.01 
PANASNegative 
(baseline) 
SA 40 .33 .37 -.51 .73 .14 .04 
HC 42 1.50 .37 2.82 .72 .14 .03 
PANASpositive 
(Anticipation) 
SA 40 .25 .37 -.82 .73 .08 .20 
HC 42 .18 .37 .31 .72 .08 .20 
PANASnegative 
(Anticipation) 
SA 40 -.02 .37 -.59 1.02 .11 .20 
HC 42 1.04 .37 .87 .72 .11 .20 
PANASpositive 
(Post-Speech) 
SA 40 .82 .37 -.59 .73 .11 .20 
HC 42 .45 .37 .16 .72 .11 .20 
PANASnegative 
(Post-Speech) 
SA 40 .39 .37 -.35 .73 .09 .20 
HC 42 1.82 .37 2.92 .72 .09 .20 
Desirability Index 
(Baseline)  
SA 39 .38 .74 .27 .94 .08 .20 
HC 42 .37 .72 -.50 .27 .11 .20 
Desirability Index 
(Postmanipulation) 
SA 40 .37 .73 -.09 -1.06 .10 .20 
HC 42 .37 .72 .29 -.08 .10 .20 
Desirability Social 
Comparison  
SA 40 .37 .73 -.35 -.04 .23 <.01 
HC 42 .37 .72 1.10 .61 .23 .00 
DFI (Baseline) SA 39 .38 .74 .67 .22 .14 .06 
HC 42 .37 .72 .01 -.50 .09 .20 
DFI 
(Postmanipulation) 
SA 39 .38 .74 .09 -.60 .07 .20 
HC 42 .37 .72 .17 -.51 .08 .20 
Perceived DFI SA 39 .38 .74 .09 -1.08 .12 .15 
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(Baseline) HC 42 .37 .72 .60 .13 .13 .06 
Percceive DFI 
(Postmanipulation) 
SA 40 .37 .73 .72 .21 .14 .05 
HC 42 .37 .72 .16 -.21 .10 .20 
INCOM  SA 40 .10 .37 .25 .73 .12 .15 
HC 42 .20 .37 .53 .72 .12 .19 
SPIN SA 40 -.35 .37 .09 .73 .07 .20 
HC 42 .40 .37 -1.00 .72 .13 .09 
DASSDep SA 27 .39 .45 2.44 .78 .09 .20 
HC 35 1.60 .40 -.50 .87 .25 .00 
NSPS SA 40 .60 .37 -.07 .73 .10 .20 
HC 42 1.03 .37 .40 .72 .16 <.01 
BlundersComposite SA 39 .38 .74 .58 -.00 .09 .20 
HC 42 .37 .72 -.10 -.42 .08 .20 
Similarity (Baseline) SA 40 -.27 .37 .02 .73 .15 .03 
HC 42 -.20 .37 .28 .72 .14 .05 
Similarity 
(Postmanipulation) 
SA 39 .39 .38 1.02 .74 .20 <.01 
HC 42 -.34 .37 -.37 .72 .17 <.01 
PSPpositive(Baseline) 
 
SA 40 .38 .37 .01 .80 .12 .15 
HC 42 .94 .37 .43 .71 .19 <.01 
PSPnegative 
(Baseline) 
SA40 -.33 .37 -.63 .73 .11 .20 
HC42 .72 .37 .00 .72 .12 .12 
PSPpositive 
(Postmanipulation) 
SA 40 .42 .37 -.21 .73 .11 .20 
HC 42  .55 .37 -.04 .72 .16 <.01 
PSPnegative 
(Postmanipulation) 
SA 40 -.33 .37 -.63 .73 .10 .20 
HC 42 1.16 .37 .63 .72 .20 <.01 
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Table 5. Means and standard deviations for study variables by group and condition (participant 
ratings) 
Measure SAD 
Anxious 
Presenter 
SAD 
Confident 
Presenter 
HC Anxious 
Presenter 
HC 
Confident 
Presenter 
Measure 
Range 
SPIN 
48.40 
(9.73) 
45.30 (8.86) 11.97 (7.80) 8.43 (8.00) 0 to 68 
PANAS Pos 
(Baseline) 
25.00(6.80) 25.60 (5.67) 28.76 (7.66) 27.29 (6.89) 10 to 50 
PANASNeg 
(Baseline) 
19.40 
(6.43) 
19.71 (4.26) 11.76 (1.87) 11.76 (2.17) 10 to 50 
PANASPos (Speech 
Anticipation) 
21.15 
(7.27) 
21.85 (6.80) 28.61 (7.12) 26.95 (8.77) 10 to 50 
PANASNeg (Speech 
Anticipation) 
27.70 
(7.31) 
29.35 (5.89) 14.14 (3.09) 13.14 (2.57) 10 to 50 
PANASPos (Post-
Speech) 
20.75 
(7.46) 
21.10 (7.15) 27.00 (6.71) 26.05 (8.64) 10 to 50 
PANASNeg(Post-
Speech) 
24.35 
(10.02) 
26.20 (7.30) 12.90 (3.00) 11.86 (2.94) 10 to 50 
Desirability 
(Baseline) 
-.14 (.70) .09 (.81) -.02 (.91) .37 (.76) -3 to 3 
Desirability 
(Postmanipulation) 
-.52 (.95) 1.16 (.89) -.37 (.66) 1.11 (.76) - 3 to 3 
Desirability – Self vs 
Presenter 
.04 (.25) -.13 (.19) .17(.17) .07 (.11) -3 to 3 
DFI (Baseline) 16.42 (4.02) 16.90 (5.00) 18.67 (5.89) 19.71 (4.35) 8 to 40 
DFI 
(Postmanipulation) 
17.42 (5.38) 21.60 (5.77) 17.29 (5.38) 22.67 (4.28) 8 to 40 
Perceived DFI with 
Self (Baseline) 
14.84 (4.46) 15.85 (4.69) 18.38 (4.68) 19.71 (5.31)  8 to 40 
Perceived DFI with 
Self 
(Postmanipulation) 
13.50 (4.01) 15.10 (5.93) 16.71 (4.21) 29.71 (5.08) 8  to 40 
INCOM  37.05 (4.27) 36.80 (4.24) 35.29 (3.27) 34.52 (2.96) 8 to 40 
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DASSDep 8.46 (6.72) 
8.00 (5.53) 2.25 (2.27) 1.32 (1.60) 0 to 21 
NSPS 80.25 
(20.33) 
76.70 (16.38) 38.43 (10.43) 42.76 (10.57) 0 to 135 
Blunders Composite 81.79 
(22.41) 
62.70 (16.45) 65.33 (14.56) 55.71 (10.26) 0 to 96 
Similarity (Baseline) 6.80 (2.24) 6.65 (1.90) 7.09 (1.84) 7.14 (1.35) 0 to 15 
Similarity 
(Postmanipulation) 
7.47 (1.47) 6.80 (1.24) 7.05 (1.53) 7.85 (1.59) 0 to 15 
PSPpositive(Baseline) 8.75(5.43) 9.30 (3.74) 14.95 (4.25) 15.05 (6.06) 0 to 40 
PSPnegative 
(Baseline) 
20.45 (8.22) 20.80 (6.96) 7.81 (3.72) 8.71 (5.14) 0 to 52 
PSPpositive 
(Postmanipulation) 
7.65 (5.76) 7.25 (4.04) 14.76 (4.98) 13.62 (6.45) 0 to 40 
PSPnegative 
(Postmanipulation) 
17.40 (8.18) 17.95 (6.74) 7.57 (4.97) 7.57 (5.29) 0 to 52 
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Table 6.  Means and standard deviations for coded study variables by group and condition  
 
Measure SAD 
Anxious 
Presenter 
SAD 
Confident 
Presenter 
HC Anxious 
Presenter 
HC 
Confident 
Presenter 
Measure Range 
Desirability -.15 (1.23) -.10 (.98) .69 (.86) .41 (.67) -3 to 3 
PSP Positive 16.93 (10.78) 18.93 (8.81) 24.96 
(7.34) 
24.09 (7.11) 0 to 40 
PSP Negative 
PSP Positive 
(Residual) 
PSP Negative 
(Residual) 
15.77 (9.45) 
-.17 (1.05) 
 
.32 (1.03) 
13.42 (7.11) 
-.53 (.71) 
 
.62 (1.00) 
8.43(6.13) 
.46 (.86) 
 
-.48 (.77) 
8.30 (5.80) 
.22 (1.07) 
 
-.42 (.74) 
0 to 52 
Unlimited 
 
Unlimited 
Blunders 41.59 (17.82) 38.30 (16.11) 27.67 
(11.39) 
26.92 (9.00) 0 to  96 
Warmth -.18 (2.20) -0.00 (1.69) .85 (1.40) .57 (1.31) -3 to 3  
Dominance -1.05(2.03) -1.03 (1.63) .24 (1.70) -.09 (1.19) -3 to 3  
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Part1: 
Introduction 
(Cover Story)  
Part 2:  
Speech Presenter 
Evaluated Based     
on Photo 
(Baseline) 
Part 3: 
Speech Presenter 
Speech Evaluated  
by Participant 
(Postmanipulation) 
Part 4:  
Participant 
Delivers  
own Speech 
Part 5:  
Final Measures 
and Funnel 
Debriefing  
Measures: 
1. Positive and 
Negative Affect 
Schedule 
(PANAS; 
Baseline) 
 
Measures: 
1.Presenter 
Desirability 
(Baseline) 
2.Desire for Future 
Interaction (DFI; 
Baseline) 
3.Perception of 
presenter's desire to 
interact with self 
(PDFI; Baseline) 
4.Similarity 
(Baseline) 
 
Measures: 
1.Presenter Desirability 
(Postmanipulation) 
2.Desire for Future 
Interaction (DFI; 
Postmanipulation) 
3.Perception of 
presenter's desire to 
interact with self (PDFI; 
Postmanipulation) 
4. Similarity 
(Postmanipulation) 
 
Measures: 
1. PANAS 
(Pre-speech) 
2.Perception 
of Speech 
Performance 
(PSP; Pre-
Speech)  
3. Negative 
Self-
Portrayal 
Scale 
(NSPS) 
 
Measures: 
1.Perception of 
speech 
performance 
(PSP;  Post-
Speech) 
2. PANAS (post-
speech) 
3.Blunders Task 
4. Depression 
Anxiety and 
Stress Scales-21 
(DASS-21) 
5. Iowa-
Netherlands 
Comparison 
Orientation Scale 
(INCOM) 
6. Social Phobia 
Inventory (SPIN) 
7. Funnel 
debriefing  
 
 
 
Measures: 
 
1. Desirability  
 
2. Perception of Speech Performance (PSP) 
 
3. Dominance and warmth ratings  
 
 
Figure 1. Sequence of study tasks and measures administered, as well as measures rated by 
coders in ratings of participant speeches. 
Part 6 (Post-Study): 
 
Coder Ratings of Participant  
Video 
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Figure 2. Desirability index scores (range -3 to 3) at baseline and postmanipulation in the 
anxious presenter condition. There was a significant main effect of time, with Desirability Index 
scores decreasing from baseline to postmanipulation. There was no main effect of group, nor a 
group by time interaction. Error bars represent 1 SD. 
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Figure 3. Desirability Index scores (range -3 to 3) at baseline and postmanipulation in the 
confident presenter condition. A main effect of time was found, with Desirability Index scores 
increasing significantly from baseline to postmanipulation. There was no main effect of group, 
and no group by time interaction. Error bars represent 1 SD. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of upward, same-level, and downward comparisons across groups and 
conditions 
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Figure 5. Standardized regression coefficients (β) for the associations between predictor 
variables group (HCs or SAD), condition (anxious or confident presenter), the interaction 
between group and condition, and the outcome variable Desire for Future Interaction with the 
partner (speech presenter), with Self Comparison (average rating of the self as compared to the 
presenter on five desirable attributes) as the mediator. Note *p < .05, 
†
p ≤. 10). 
  
Group x 
Condition 
Condition 
Group 
SelfComparison 
DFI 
d2 
 d1 
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Figure 6. 
Standardized regression coefficients (β) for the association between Condition (Anxious or 
Confident) and Desire for Future Interaction with the partner (speech presenter) mediated by Self 
Comparison (average rating of the self as compared to the presenter on five desirable attributes). 
The standardized regression coefficient for the relationship between condition and DFI 
controlling for Self-Comparison (i.e., the indirect effect) is provided in parentheses. Note *p < 
.05, 
†
p ≤ .10). 
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D
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Figure 7. Standardized regression coefficients (β) for the association between Group (Anxious or 
Confident) and Desire for Future Interaction with the partner (speech presenter) mediated by Self 
Comparison (average rating of the self as compared to the presenter on five desirable attributes). 
The standardized regression coefficient for the relationship between group and DFI controlling 
for Self Comparison (i.e., the indirect effect) is provided in parentheses. Note *p <.05. 
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Figure 8. The Interpersonal Circumplex (Leary, 1957) uses the orthogonal dimensions of 
dominance and warmth to identify eight distinct octants. Each octant thus represents a unique 
combination of dominance and warmth. Dominance is represented on the vertical axis and 
warmth is represented on the horizontal axis, and each ranged from 3 (highest warmth and 
dominance) to -3 (lowest warmth or dominance or highest coldness and submissiveness). The 
average rating provided by coders for dominance and warmth for participants with SAD and HCs 
based on recorded speeches are provided. The octant names provided are taken from the 
Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP-64; Horowitz, Alden, Wiggins, & Pincus, 2000). 
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